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I certainly don't want to debate about GAAP. 
—Enron Task Force Prosecutor Kathryn Ruemmler1 
We live in a litigious society so people would prefer to have prescriptive guidance, 
so they can say they followed the rules. 
—Anonymous public company CFO2 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers reopened wounds many thought 
were healed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (“SOX”) in 2002. The Lehman litigation 
finally ended in late 2013 with audit firm Ernst & Young paying $99 million to 
investors3 who claimed the firm misled them with generally accepted accounting 
principles (“GAAP”).4 Other defendants, including banks, officers, and directors, 
paid out more than $500 million.5  
                                                
* Associate Professor of Accounting & Business Law and Director of Law, Ethics & Regulation, 
Corporate Governance Center, Coles College of Business, Kennesaw State University.  Of 
Counsel, Slappey & Sadd, LLC, Atlanta, Georgia.  J.D., Georgia State University College of Law, 
cum laude. 
1 Transcript of Sentencing at 18:14-15, U.S. v. Causey (S.D. Tex. 2006) (H-04-025-SS) [hereinafter 
Causey Transcript].  
2 Ilia D. Dichev, John Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shiva Rajgopal, Earnings Quality: Evidence 
from the Field 31 (SSRN Working Papers Series, Abstract No. 2103384. 2013), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103384. 
3 See Michael Rapoport, Ernst & Young Agrees to Pay $99 Million in Lehman Settlement, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 18, 2013, available at  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304384104579143811517891526.   
4 See infra notes 118-129 and accompanying text (discussing the Lehman case). 
5 Id. 
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The bright line standards of GAAP and SOX were obviously not enough 
to protect Lehman plaintiffs or defendants. Why not? The 2006 fraud trial of 
Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling offers clues. When asked at trial whether U.S. 
accounting principles (GAAP) permitted Enron’s accountants to mislead Enron’s 
auditors, Skilling’s accounting expert Walter Rush replied: “[T]his isn't even an 
issue under GAAP. GAAP doesn't talk about misleading. GAAP doesn't talk 
about integrity. GAAP talks about accounting rules, how you measure assets and 
liabilities, what kind of disclosures you make.”6 At about the same time, the 
SEC’s Chief Accountant declared that most financial statements are misleading.7 
Enron, it seems, was no anomaly.  
In leading recent securities cases, federal courts have disregarded or 
studiously avoided GAAP and accounting experts, examining more broadly 
whether financial statements are “fairly presented” or “not misleading,” thus 
dismissing costly accounting testimony as irrelevant and suddenly exposing 
defendants—like those in Lehman—to unforeseen legal exposure. Remarkably, 
undiluted FASB8 GAAP remains the primary fuel for the analytical engines of 
America’s financial markets; and therefore,  misleading FASB GAAP financial 
statements continue to circulate, misinforming the decisions of investors and 
creditors and potentially setting the stage for the next Lehman. With the SEC 
again considering a switch to the IASB’s9 IFRS10 accounting system, profound 
changes to the SEC’s approach to financial statements deserve serious 
consideration.  
In January 1932, American accounting luminary George O. May sought to 
limit the auditor’s role to telling shareholders whether financial statements fairly 
present the company’s financial position and results.11 May used a leading British 
                                                
6 Transcript of Record at 16848-16849, United States v. Skilling (S.D. Tex. 2006) (04-CR-25) 
[hereinafter Skilling Transcript].  
7 Don Nicolaisen, SEC Chief Accountant, 2005 PCAOB Standing Advisory Group (SAG) 
meeting (Oct. 5-6 2005),  
http://pcaobus.org/News/Webcasts/Pages/10052005_SAGMeeting.aspx (“If I were to opine on 
a set of financial statements with my own views, there are few that I would find to be other than 
misleading.”).  
8 Financial Accounting Standards Board. 
9 International Accounting Standards Board. 
10 International Financial Reporting Standards. 
11 GEORGE O. MAY, THE ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN ACCOUNTANCY: LECTURES 
DELIVERED IN 1932 (1933), reprinted in The Accountant and the Investor, 16 ACCT. HISTORIANS J. 219, 
222 (1989). May was Senior Partner of Price Waterhouse and Company’s New York office, 
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case, The King v. Lord Kylsant,12 to argue that while selection of accounting 
treatments is inherently contextual and judgmental,13 audit opinions should “be so 
worded that not only will every statement made therein be literally true, but every 
inference which could legitimately be drawn from the language will be warranted 
by the facts.”14 Paradoxically, current SEC and professional standards encourage 
the opposite.  
Federal securities law requires that public company15 financial statements 
and disclosures be “not misleading” 16 and presumes that financial statements not 
compliant with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) are misleading.17 
CEOs and CFOs of public companies must personally certify that the company’s 
(a) financial statements are fairly presented, (b) SEC reports, which often include 
financial statements, are not misleading, and (c) disclosure controls and internal 
                                                                                                                           
Chairman of the American Institute of Accountant’s [hereinafter AIA] Special Committee on 
Cooperation with Stock Exchanges, and accounting advisor to the New York Stock Exchange 
[hereinafter NYSE]. STEPHEN A. ZEFF, FORGING ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES IN 5 COUNTRIES  
122, n. 29 (1971) [hereinafter ZEFF 1971]. This is the first recorded mention of fairly present in 
relation to financial reporting in the United States. The phrase “present fairly” has been credited 
to NYSE President Richard Whitney. See Stephen A. Zeff, The primacy of "present fairly" in the 
auditor's report, 6 ACCT. PERSPECTIVES 1, 2-5 (2007) [hereinafter Zeff 2007]. However, the record 
indicates that May anticipated Whitney by one year. The term “results” means “earnings” or 
“income.” Hereinafter, the term “auditor” means an external auditor of financial statements 
typically prepared by internal accountants denominated hereinafter (mostly) as “preparers.” 
However, depending on context, the term “accountant” may apply to auditors, preparers or both. 
12 L.R. [1932] 1 K.B. 442 
13 MAY, supra note 12, at 228. 
14 Id. at 230 (emphasis added). 
15 Depending on context, this article interchangeably uses the terms public company, issuer, and 
registrant to signify “SEC registrant.” An issuer is any person who issues or proposes to issue any 
security. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(8) (2014). In general, an issuer becomes an SEC registrant—and must 
therefore register with and periodically submit financial statements and other disclosures to the 
SEC—when its total assets exceed $10,000,000 and it has a non-exempt class of equity securities 
held by 2,000 persons, or 500 persons who are not “accredited” investors. 15 U.S.C. § 
78l(g)(1)(A)-(B) (2014). Foreign private issuers [hereinafter FPI], as distinguished from domestic 
issuers, with fewer than 300 security holders resident in the United States are exempt from 
registration. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a) (2014).  
16 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2014). 
17 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2014).  
234 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16 
 
 
controls over financial reporting are effective.18 These requirements, though 
impossible to summarize in a coherent Venn diagram, nevertheless seem to 
promise reliable—though not necessarily useful or relevant—financial 
information. But even this limited promise is misleading.  
SEC regulations and policy guidance do not define “misleading” or 
“generally accepted accounting principles” nor do they presume that GAAP-
compliant financial statements are not misleading.19 SEC regulations do not 
require auditors to opine on financial statement fair presentation or compliance 
with GAAP. On the other hand while PCAOB and AICPA20 standards 
superficially agree that auditors must opine on both, they diverge over what, if 
anything, fair presentation means beyond mere GAAP compliance. The FASB 
itself is largely silent on fair presentation but sternly warns preparers to comply 
with its GAAP no matter what.  
Partly because of these conflicting signals, accountants tend to 
superficially equate fair presentation with bare conformity to FASB-promulgated 
GAAP (FASB GAAP),21 largely disregarding fair presentation and the “not 
misleading” mandates. As a result, today’s standard audit opinions answer a 
mostly irrelevant question—whether the financial statements conform to FASB 
                                                
18 See infra Part III.A. (discussing required certifications under Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302 and 
906). 
19 See generally, e.g., SEC, DIVISION OF CORPORATION FINANCE, FINANCIAL REPORTING MANUAL 
(2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cffinancialreportingmanual.shtml (using 
the term “misleading” thirteen times without defining it, except with respect to specific 
transactions or events). However, a 2003 SEC policy statement purports to declare FASB GAAP 
“generally accepted.” SEC, POLICY STATEMENT: REAFFIRMING THE STATUS OF THE FASB AS A 
DESIGNATED PRIVATE-SECTOR STANDARD SETTER, FINANCIAL REPORTING RELEASE NO. 70 
(Apr. 25, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm#P25_3300 
[hereinafter FR-70].  
20 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [hereinafter PCAOB] prescribes public 
company auditing standards; private company standards are published by the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants [hereinafter AICPA]. 
21 See Ronald M. Mano, Matthew L. Mouritsen & James G. Swearingen, Accounting profession, heal 
thyself: A matter of survival, 73 CPA J., Aug. 2003, at 6, 8 (citing notorious cases supporting the 
proposition that accountants too often equate “fairly presented” with “in accordance with 
GAAP). This article distinguishes between broadly defined GAAP (the universe of accounting 
principles that enjoys some level of general acceptance) and FASB GAAP (rules promulgated by 
the FASB at https://asc.fasb.org/). See also ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION subtopic 
105-10-05 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2013) [hereinafter FASB CODIFICATION], available at 
https://asc.fasb.org/ (purporting to designate the FASB CODIFICATION as the only 
“authoritative” source of U.S. GAAP, beginning in 2009). 
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GAAP—while giving lip service to fairness and saying nothing about predictive 
usefulness.  
Judges, prosecutors, and plaintiffs take the opposite view. Their 
preference for fair presentation over technical GAAP compliance is under-
appreciated by corporate directors, officers, auditors, and their attorneys and 
accounting experts, who often seem genuinely surprised by judicial distaste for 
and dismissal of GAAP. Some view highly prescriptive GAAP as safe and 
predictable.22 Yet, it may actually increase risk on all sides. Brighter lines create an 
illusion of certainty in the minds of readers, discourage accountants from 
exercising professional judgment, and suggest to courts that accounting experts 
are either irrelevant or unhelpful in answering case-critical questions. Who needs 
an expert to read bright lines?   
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Part I examines 
leading securities cases that demonstrate the tendency of federal courts to ignore 
accounting experts and to misinterpret accounting literature. Part II chronicles 
the ongoing debate over fair presentation and outlines current AICPA, PCAOB, 
and FASB interpretations, adducing evidence that FASB GAAP systematically 
misleads readers. Part III summarizes relevant U.S. and U.K. statutes and 
regulations. Part IV draws conclusions, while Part V closes with related 
recommendations suggested by the U.K. Companies Act 2006, the IASB, and the 
FASB’s own Concepts Statement No. 8, which may help to restore the 
courtroom relevance of accounting experts. While this article addresses only the 
weight accorded to their testimony, reserving to future discussion its admissibility 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence,23 it may also be helpful in evaluating 
admissibility in particular cases. 
I. CASE LAW  
In Part I, a famous British case sets the stage for consideration of 
subsequent U.S. case law which is presented in chronological order. The overall 
theme of these opinions is a disregard for accounting standards in favor of 
broader fair presentation. Additionally, a line of cases beginning with Basic, Inc. v. 
                                                
22 See Dichev et al., supra note 2, at 30-31  (citing evidence that fear of litigation drives public 
company CFOs toward accounting rules so prescriptive that they sometimes “don’t reflect the 
economic substance of the transaction.”). 
23 Qualified expert testimony is admissible if “the expert’s . . . specialized knowledge will help the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702(a). 
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Levinson24 is included to elucidate the judicial interpretation of materiality, a 
concept essential to all securities cases. 
A. The King v. Lord Kylsant 
In 1928, Lord Kylsant, a director of Royal Mail Steam Packet Co. (Royal 
Mail), published a prospectus promoting Royal Mail debentures. 25 The prospectus 
avowed that while Royal Mail had “suffered from the depression in the shipping 
industry [like other firms], the audited accounts . . . show that during the past ten 
years the average annual balance available . . . after providing for depreciation and 
interest on existing debenture stocks, has been sufficient to pay the interest on 
the present issue more than five times over,”26 and that dividends were paid in 
every year from 1911 to 1927 except 1914.27   
However, the prospectus omitted key contrary indicators. While World 
War I made the 1918-to-1920 interval highly profitable, thereafter, Royal Mail had 
consistently incurred substantial losses and paid dividends in years 1921-1927 
only out of non-recurring war-time sources of cash such as tax refunds, “war 
contingency reserves,” and a deferred repairs account.28 At trial, Kylsant was 
                                                
24 Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
25 King, L.R. [1932] 1 K.B. 442. . Kylsant’s inferential reasoning doctrine broadly informs U.S. 
securities case law but is cited as authority in the United States only by the pre-SEC Eighth 
Circuit. See Foshay v. U.S., 68 F.2d 205, 210 (8th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U.S. 674 (1934) 
(applying the federal mail fraud statute where defendants misled investors to believe the company 
was earning regular profits by touting monthly “dividends” actually paid out of invested capital). 
E.g., A debenture is a bond secured only by the issuer’s reputation. THOMPSON REUTERS, 
Debenture, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/debenture.asp (last visited 
Apr.7, 2015).  Foshay is cited by subsequent cases involving the sale of securities. See, e.g., Deaver v. 
U.S., 155 F.2d 740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1946); U.S. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 47 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D. 
Mass. 1942).  See also Greenhill v. U.S., 298 F.2d 405, 411 (5th Cir. 1962) (holding that honest 
belief in a venture’s ultimate success does not justify false representations in the sale of its 
securities) (citing Foshay, 68 F.2d 205; Danser v. U.S., 281 F.2d 492, 496-97 (1st Cir. 1960) 
(upholding conviction for violating Securities Act § 17(a) where, around Jul. 23, 1954, the 
defendant circulated a prospectus dated Mar. 31, 1954 that omitted material intervening losses 
known to the defendant); Proffer v. U.S., 288 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1961); U.S. v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 
928 (2d Cir. 1961)  Linn v. United States, 234 F. 543, 552 (7th Cir. 1916) (where defendant 
materially misled prospective investors to believe that he controlled a mine, his honest belief in 
the ultimate success of the mining venture was not a mail fraud defense)).  
26 Kylsant (Lord) np. 
27 Id.  
 
28 Id. 
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found guilty of circulating a prospectus he knew was materially false with the 
intent to induce investment in Royal Mail debentures.29  
The Criminal Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the prospectus could 
be expected to lead readers to infer that the company was financially sound and 
that a “prudent investor could safely invest.”30 The court held that even though 
the prospectus was “letter by letter, word by word, an accurate document, so far 
as it goes,” Kylsant was indeed guilty of larceny for fraudulently inducing bond 
subscriptions.31 In other words, Kylsant’s otherwise factually accurate prospectus 
misled readers to infer that Royal Mail’s financial future was bright while 
undisclosed negative information suggested it might not be so.  
Kylsant was not an accountant but he played a similar role as an 
information intermediary. In the United States, George May used Kylsant to argue 
that accountants must ensure that “no statement is put forward which is a half-
truth or which . . . will probably give rise” to ill-founded inferences.32 May also 
argued that while they are not fairly accountable for unwarranted inferences 
drawn by ignorant or careless investors, accountants should be held responsible 
for inferences that flow naturally from the literal truths of their words.33  
B. U.S. v. Simon 
The statutory phrase “not misleading” first appeared in Sections 17(a) and 
19(a) of the Securities Act.34 Thereafter, it was included in the FTC’s 
implementing regulations.35 In case law, the phrase “not misleading” was first 
                                                
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Kylsant was indicted for violating Larceny Act, 1861 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96,  § 84, which 
criminalized the publication of any written “statement or account which he shall know to be false 
in any material particular, with intent . . . to induce any person . . . to intrust or advance any 
property to [a] company . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .” Id. 
32 MAY, supra note 12, at 231-232. 
33 Id. at 232. 
34 Securities Act §§ 17(a) and 19(a) (1933). 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(q), 77(b) (1916). 
35 FED. TRADE COMM., RULES AND REGULATIONS UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, Art. 15 
(Jul. 6, 1933).  
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mentioned in 1936 in U.S. v. Alluan.36 The most influential decision, however, was 
U.S. v. Simon which was handed down in 1969.37  
In Simon, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld convictions of a 
partner, junior partner, and senior associate of audit firm Lybrand, Ross Bros. & 
Montgomery.38 The defendants were convicted for “certifying” financial 
statements that omitted mention of a $3.9 million related party receivable and the 
collateral securing its repayment.39 At trial, the defendants’ eight expert 
accounting witnesses—characterized by the appellate court as “an impressive 
array of leaders of the profession”—testified that the defendants’ financial 
statements were not inconsistent with GAAP except for one relatively minor 
error.40 On these facts, the trial court denied the defense request for a jury 
instruction that 
a defendant could be found guilty only if, according to generally 
accepted accounting principles, the financial statements as a whole 
did not fairly present the financial condition of [the firm] and then 
only if his departure from accepted standards was due to willful 
disregard . . . with knowledge of the falsity of the statements and 
an intent to deceive.41   
Instead, the court instructed the jury that: 
the “critical test” was whether the financial statements as a whole 
“fairly presented the financial position and accurately reported the 
operations [of the firm].” If they did not, the basic issue became 
whether defendants acted in good faith. Proof of compliance with 
generally accepted standards was “evidence which may be very 
persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that [they] acted in good 
faith, and that the facts as certified were not materially false or 
misleading. . . .”42  
                                                
13 F.Supp. 289, 291 (N.D. Tex. 1936). 
37 U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied  397 U.S. 1006 (1970). 
38 Id. at 800-01. 
39 Id. . 
40 Id. at 805. 
41 Id. at 805. 
42 Id. at 805-06 (emphasis added). 
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In other words, the jury’s inquiry must start with fair presentation (for 
financial position or balance sheet) or accuracy (for operations or income 
statement),43 including materiality, and then proceed to culpability against which 
GAAP compliance may be a persuasive defense.44The Second Circuit agreed that 
the jury was not  
required to accept the accountants’ evaluation whether a given 
fact was material to overall fair presentation, at least not when the 
accountants’ testimony was not based on specific rules or 
prohibitions to which they could point, but only on the need for 
the auditor to make an honest judgment and their conclusion that 
nothing in the financial statements themselves negated the 
conclusion that an honest judgment had been made.45  
The core Simon doctrine, that fair presentation or accuracy trumps GAAP 
compliance in proving securities fraud, has since spread to other circuits.46 
C. Materiality 
Materiality merits its own sidebar discussion. Materiality is an essential 
element of securities fraud because only material information is required to 
achieve fair presentation. Yet, despite materiality’s legal importance, neither 
statute nor regulation defines it. Attempting to fill this gap, in Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson,47 the U.S. Supreme Court held that “materiality depends on the 
significance the reasonable investor would place on the withheld or 
                                                
43 Why the court distinguished fair presentation from accuracy is unclear.  
44 Scienter is the “mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976). Recklessness may also constitute scienter. See 
Dain Rauscher, Inc., 254 F.3d at 856. But see Mattrix v. Sircusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323 (2011) 
(citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 n.3) (2007) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether recklessness amounts to scienter)). Criminal 
conviction requires scienter; civil liability generally requires only negligence. 
45 Simon, 425 F.2d at 806. 
46 See, e.g., SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011); In re K-tel Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 
F.3d 881, 906 (8th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1482 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995); McLean v. 
Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1085 (D. Del. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 
1979).  
47 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 224 (1988). 
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misrepresented information.”48 Furthermore, the Court held that an omitted fact 
is material if there is a “substantial likelihood” that its disclosure “would have 
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total 
mix’ of information available” with respect to the security in question,49 and that 
“[a]ny approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always 
determinative of materiality, must necessarily be over inclusive or under 
inclusive.”50  
In 2011, the Court reaffirmed Basic’s total mix test and clarified that 
material causality may be inferred from other evidence with or without “statistical 
significance.”51 Along similar lines, SEC staff have opined that information may 
be material quantitatively, qualitatively, or both.52 
The quantitative materiality of forward-looking or contingent information 
should be assessed using an expected value framework balancing the probability 
of the event and its anticipated magnitude in relation to the activity of the 
company as a whole.53 Materiality should not “attribute to investors a child-like 
                                                
48 Id. at 240. 
49 Id. at 231-32 (quoting TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). 
50 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 236 n.14 (citing H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 
95TH CONG., REP. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 327 (Comm. Print 1977) (noting that “absolute certainty in the 
application of the materiality concept . . . is illusory and unrealistic”)). Compare Council Directive 
2013/34/EU, art. 2, 2013 O.J. (L 182) 19, 28 (defining “material” as “the status of information 
where its omission or misstatement could reasonably be expected to influence decisions that users 
make on the basis of the financial statements of the undertaking”).  
51 Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318-23 (2011) (applying the Basic “total 
mix” test in holding that pharmaceutical adverse event reports showing no statistically significant 
increased risk of harm from Zinc-based nasal spray were nevertheless material under Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which create an affirmative duty to disclose only that material information 
necessary to avoid misleading). 
52 SAB No. 99, available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm. Quantitative 
misstatements of less than 5%-of-basis are often viewed as material.52 Id. (citing as potentially 
significant qualitative factors whether the misstatement (a) masks a change in earnings or other 
trends; (b) affects the registrant's compliance with regulatory requirements; (c) affects the 
registrant's compliance with loan covenants or other contractual requirements; or (d) involves 
concealment of an unlawful transaction). 
53 Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 238 (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 
1968)). Expected value is the “the mean of a probability distribution” obtained by weighting each 
possible outcome by its probability, where the sum of the probabilities of individual outcomes 
equals one. See JOHN K. KRUSCHKE, DOING BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS 37 (2011). 
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simplicity [or] an inability to grasp the probabilistic significance of negotiations” 
but should “filter out . . . information that a reasonable investor would not 
consider significant.”54 Thus, the scope of legally material information has been 
held to exclude puffery and general expressions of optimism.55However, 
intentionally misleading press releases have been found sufficiently material to 
violate Exchange Act Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.56 
D. U.S. v. Skilling & Lay 
The collapse of Enron Corporation launched scores of civil and criminal 
actions;57 a comprehensive survey of which would fill a shelf of law review 
articles.58 Two earn mention here: the widely publicized criminal jury trial of 
Jeffrey Skilling and Ken Lay and the plea bargain and sentencing hearing of 
Richard Causey.59 Media and government blamed Enron’s demise on fraudulent 
accounting. 60  Similarly, the government’s indictment of Causey, Skilling, and Lay 
                                                
54 Basic, Inc., 485 U.S. at 234 (quoting TSC Industries, 426 U.S. at 448-49). 
55 See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosenzweig v. 
Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854, 865 (5th Cir. 2003);; Searls v. Glasser, 64 F.3d 1061, 1066 (7th Cir. 
1995); In re Sec. Litig. BMC Software, Inc., 183 F.Supp.2d 860, 888 (S.D. Tex. 2001). 
56 See, e.g., SEC v. Platforms Wireless Int’l Corp., 617 F.3d 1072, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2010) (aff’g 
Rule 10b-5-based summary judgment against a defendant that issued a press release describing 
technical details and performance characteristics of a wireless communications system while 
actually possessing only a description of the system but no prototype or money to build one); 
Ponder Indus., Inc., 65 S.E.C. Docket 45, 1997 WL 409773 (July 22, 1997). ( (where respondent 
believed his company would receive revenue but knew receipt was subject to contingencies, the 
SEC found that he had violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in part by omitting mention of the 
contingencies).  
57 See Tom Fowler, Ex-Enron CEO Skilling’s Sentence Cut to 14 Years, WALL ST. J., Jun. 21, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323393804578559603861442848.html (citing 
criminal charges against “nearly three dozen executives and employees of Enron” and its business 
partners). 
58 On September 16, 2013, the Lexis-Nexis law review database returned 276 articles containing 
“Enron” in the title. 
59 Causey was Enron’s Chief Accounting Officer; Skilling and Lay had each been CEO. Skilling’s 
case concluded in June 2013 with his resentencing downward to 14 years from 24. See Fowler, 
supra note 60.    
60 See, e.g., Alex Berenson, Enron's Collapse: The Accountants; Watching the Firms That Watch the Books, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at C1 (asserting that “the sudden failure of Enron . . . has generated a 
new wave of criticism that corporate accounting is out of control”); Enron: The Real Scandal, THE 
ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2002, available at http://www.economist.com/node/940091 (asserting that 
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repeatedly accused them of “manipulating” or “circumventing” accounting 
standards61 in Forms 10-K and 10-Q and related management representation 
letters sent to auditors.62  
Yet, despite the pretrial accounting hype, at trial the government began 
and ended its opening argument denying any accounting connection: “This is a 
simple case. It is not about accounting. It is about lies and choices.”63 This 
opening could hardly be more misleading.64 It was definitely not a simple case and 
was mostly about accounting; the government itself used the root word 
                                                                                                                           
Enron’s collapse signals systemic defects in U.S. accounting standards); Mary Flood, Enron’s 
Former Top Accountant Arrested, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 22, 2004, 
http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/Enron-s-former-top-accountant-arrested-
1556608.php (quoting an ETF prosecutor as saying that Enron was “propped up by accounting 
schemes”).   But see Tom Fowler, Some Say Enron Deserves a Brighter Legacy, HOUSTON CHRON. 
(Dec. 3, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/article/Some-say-Enron-deserves-brighter-legacy-
2341651.php (quoting observers who argue that Enron’s conduct was not as bad as portrayed). 
Enron’s accounting has also been controversial in academic and professional circles. Cf. C. 
Richard Baker & Rick Hayes, The Enron Fallout: Was Enron an Accounting Failure?, 31 MANAGERIAL 
FIN. 5, 9-23 (2005) (discussing various Enron accounting techniques, characterizing some as 
permissible and others not under GAAP); Neville Grusd, The Enron affair from a lender's view, CPA 
J., Dec. 2002, at 8 (stating that Enron’s “use of off-balance-sheet partnerships to hide losses . . . 
[was] permitted by current rules”); Anthony Luppino, Stopping the Enron End-Runs and Other Trick 
Plays: The Book-Tax Accounting Conformity Defense, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 69-77 (describing 
GAAP on SPEs as “questionable” and “haphazard” but characterizing Enron’s application 
thereof as “clear error,” “notorious” and “infamous”).  
61 Superseding Indictment at 10-13, 16, 18-19, 24, 31, 33, 52, U.S. v. Skilling Cr. No. H-04-25 
(S.D. Tex. Jul. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Skilling Indictment] . The version of events presented to the 
Skilling jury may have been misleading because of alleged material misstatements and omissions of 
ETF prosecutors. See, e.g., UNGAGGED.net, Attorney Ethics Complaint (Jul. 24, 2012), available at 
http://ungagged.net/concealingevidence.php (alleging that ETF prosecutor Ruemmler withheld 
exculpatory SEC investigative interview notes contradicting the government’s version of Enron’s 
so-called Nigerian Barges Deal). 
62 Skilling Indictment at 46-47, 49-53. 
63 Skilling Transcript at 347, 394. 
64 See John C. Hueston, Behind the Scenes of the Enron Trial: Creating the Decisive Moments, 44 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 197, 197-98 (2007) (admitting that the ETF’s case was centered on “allegations of 
earnings manipulation and disputes over . . . the application of often arcane accounting rules”); 
Skilling Transcript at 376 (in opening argument, Prosecutor Hueston telling the jury they would 
“hear a lot about Raptors” which were “very complicated financial structures” that “look like 
spider webs” through which “the accountants and the lawyers crawled” but which the jury could 
ignore because “It's a case about lies, folks. . . .”). 
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“account” thirty times in opening65 and seventy-nine times in closing.66 
Furthermore, while the government did not call its own accounting expert, it 
thoroughly cross-examined the two defense experts and used five current or 
former Enron or Andersen accountants as fact witnesses on accounting issues.67  
Defense experts Jerry Arnold and Walter Rush both testified that Enron’s 
accounting was GAAP compliant overall.68  Both, however,  also ran into trouble 
on issues of critical importance to the jury’s verdict and on the relevance of 
accountants in securities fraud cases generally. Early in Rush’s direct examination, 
the court undercut his testimony in responding to a prosecution objection, as 
follows: 
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And just as a general matter, a company 
such as Exxon [sic], with its size, can you give the jury a sense, 
when we're talking about what would be immaterial, what kinds of 
dollar amounts would we typically be talking about? 
PROSECUTOR: Objection on 403. I just want to make clear 
we're talking about accounting materiality? 
THE COURT: Yes. I've already explained to the jury, and . . . I'll 
reiterate later, in a week or two, the legal definition of 
“materiality”. . . . It’s different from accounting materiality that 
Mr. Rush is getting ready to explain.69 
In other words, as to materiality—arguably one of two words (the other being 
misleading) upon which the entire case turned—the $600-per-hour defense 
                                                
65 Skilling Transcript at 347-96 (repeating “accountant”, “accountants”, and “accounting” thirty 
times). 
66 Skilling Transcript at 17687-834. 
67 Enron Trial: Profiles Of Prosecution Witnesses, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113898435336064528.html (summarizing testimony of Wesley 
Colwell, Wanda Curry, Sherron Watkins, John R. Sult and Thomas Bauer). Causey was technically 
available for either prosecution or defense, but neither side called him to testify. Id. 
68 Skilling Transcript at 16441-526, 16716-17823 (reporting the direct testimony of Arnold and 
Rush). 
69 Id. at 16736-37. According to the trial transcript, the court never returned to define “accounting 
materiality” or to cite authority on any discrepancy between it and legal materiality.  
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accounting expert70 was about to speak a foreign language that the jury must 
disregard as a matter of law.  
The court’s evisceration of Arnold was perhaps more devastating. Under 
cross examination, when Arnold was asked whether Enron investors would want 
to know that Enron had a “one billion dollar accounting error on its books,” the 
court interjected, “That’s a question for the jury to decide. He [Arnold] testified 
as to accounting materiality, not to the issues that will go before this jury.”71 
Given the apparent irrelevance of accounting materiality, whatever the court 
meant by it, it is unclear why the court allowed Arnold’s testimony in the first 
place.72 
In Basic, the Supreme Court held that materiality must be evaluated from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable investor, not of an accounting expert.73 However, 
against Skilling, the government pushed far beyond Basic, calling as witnesses two 
“common investors” for the express purpose of providing a “human 
perspective,” playing to the jury’s emotions and marginalizing their objective 
consideration of materiality.74 The defense called no one in rebuttal75 and, as 
explained below, failed at trial and on appeal to defend Basic’s reasonable investor 
test.  
On direct, Rush testified that Enron’s accounting for reserves and 
operating segments were GAAP compliant and free of material misstatement.76 
                                                
70 Id. at 16724 (estimating Rush’s witness fees at $570,000). Arnold was paid $600,000. Id. at 
16708-09. 
71 Id. at 16677. 
72 A few months before Enron’s implosion, Robert Prentice prophetically declared, “Unless 
accountant experts can take relevant accounting expertise and meld it with ‘accepted legal 
theories,’ their testimony will be rejected by the courts and serve no purpose.” Robert A. Prentice, 
The Case for Educating Legally-Aware Accountants, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 597, 617-18 (2001). 
73 See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text (discussing materiality-related holdings in Basic and 
other cases). 
74 See Hueston, supra note 57, at 208-09 (admitting that after failing to find a  single stock analyst 
who had been deceived by Enron’s filings or disclosures, the ETF resorted to “common 
investors” to provide a “human perspective” who, while offering “less compelling evidence of 
materiality,” would “level the field in the battle for jury empathy”); Enron Trial: Profiles Of 
Prosecution Witnesses, supra note 70 (summarizing testimony of former Enron employees John Sides 
and Johnny Nelson who lost retirement funds invested in Enron stock). 
75 See Enron Trial: Profiles Of Defense Witnesses, WALL ST. J., May 16, 2006, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114416411098516589.html.  
76 Skilling Transcript at 16724-16823. 
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Rush also implied that materiality is purely quantitative,77 failing to mention that 
materiality may be established either quantitatively or qualitatively, according to both 
the AICPA78 and SEC staff.79 This task was left to prosecutor Sean Berkowitz 
who finagled Rush into the following clown-car colloquy: 
Q: And, sir, the question, I think, is a simple one. Maybe I'm 
wrong. If [Enron accountant] Mr. Colwell misled Arthur 
Andersen, you're saying that that would be okay under GAAP? 
A: No. I didn't say that. GAAP doesn't even -- this isn't even an 
issue under GAAP. GAAP doesn't talk about misleading. GAAP 
doesn't talk about integrity. GAAP talks about accounting rules, 
how you measure assets and liabilities, what kind of disclosures 
you make.80 
Thus, after the court neutralized both defense experts on materiality, on culpability, 
one of the two effectively indicted the U.S. accounting profession as heedless of 
integrity and the allegedly misleading nature of Enron’s financial statements.81 No 
prosecutor could hope for more. 
Two days later, on May 5, 2006, the defense proposed a Simon-based jury 
instruction that GAAP compliance is “highly persuasive, but not necessarily 
conclusive evidence that Enron's financial disclosures and defendants’ public 
statements were not materially false or misleading and that defendants . . . acted 
in good faith.”82  
The government’s case was based largely on revenue from so-called 
“secret oral side deals” allegedly struck by Skilling and Enron CFO Andy Fastow 
by which Enron allegedly guaranteed that Fastow’s partnerships would lose no 
                                                
77 Id. at 16735, 16736-37, 16758, 16759. 
78See SAS No. 47 at ¶¶ 6-7 (1983), available at http://umiss.lib.olemiss.edu:82/record=b1038073.  
79 See Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99, available at, 
http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm .  
80 Skilling Transcript at 16848-49. 
81 Accountants in IFRS-adopting countries, including the European Union, should theoretically 
escape similar condemnation because of “not misleading” and “true and fair view” exceptions 
discussed in text accompanying notes 174-75 and 220-21.  
82 Jeffrey Skilling’s Supplemental Proposed Jury Instructions at 3, U.S. v. Skilling, No. H-04-25, 
2006 WL 1316581 (S.D. Tex. May 5, 2006) . 
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money on specific transactions.83 The government claimed that the oral side deals 
rendered Enron’s recognition of revenue from the transactions misleading.84 
Arguing that the side deals were legally invalid and unenforceable, the defense 
requested that the jury be instructed how to determine their legal validity and 
how, if at all, they should be recorded in Enron’s financial books.85  
The court rejected the defense’s proposed GAAP and oral side deals 
instructions, substituting in their place the following:  
A violation of [accounting requirements] . . . should not be 
considered by you as a violation of the criminal law. 
Whether the defendants followed or deviated from [them] is one 
circumstance you are entitled to consider and weigh in 
determining whether the defendants had the required specific 
intent . . . .86 
 . . . . 
 . . . Reliance on the advice of an accountant or attorney 
may constitute good faith. To decide whether such reliance was in 
good faith, you may consider whether the defendant relied on a 
competent accountant or attorney concerning the material facts 
allegedly omitted or misrepresented. . . .87  
These instructions did not reference GAAP and effectively barred the jury from 
relying on accounting or accountants for anything but scienter. On scienter, 
remarkably, the jury was free to decide that following “accounting requirements” 
could be evidence of criminal intent while violating them could not. In relation to 
not misleading, the court defined misleading omissions as failures to disclose “material 
information . . . necessary to make an allegedly false statement accurate or 
                                                
83 U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 538-41 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, on other grounds,  
561 U.S. 358  (2010) (discussing alleged “secret side deals” in relation to Cuiaba, Nigerian Barge, 
Raptor, and “Global Galactic” transactions).  
84 Id. at 538-41.   
85 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey K. Skilling at 99, U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 
2007) (No. 06-20885) [hereinafter Skilling Brief]. 
86 Skilling Transcript at 17650-51. 
87 Id. at 17653. 
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complete” but offered no definition of misleading statements or fair presentation.88 
Finally, on materiality, the court rejected a detailed defense proposal89 and 
departed from Basic90 as follows:  
[F]or you to find a fact or omission material, the Government 
must prove . . . that the fact misstated or the fact omitted was of 
such importance that it could reasonably be expected to . . . 
induce a person to invest or . . . not to invest in Enron stock. 
Assessment of materiality requires you to view the facts misstated 
or the fact omitted in the context of all the circumstances, 
including the total mix of information made available. 
The securities fraud statute . . . does not cover minor or 
meaningless or unimportant misstatements or omissions.91  
Under Basic, an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that 
its disclosure would have been (not “could reasonably be expected to be”) viewed by 
the reasonable investor (not merely “a person”) as having significantly altered the “total 
mix” of information available (not merely “could reasonably induce 
investment”).92 Some allegations undergirding the government’s case against 
Skilling, which the defense characterized as non-specific puffery, have been held 
immaterial as a matter of law in other cases.93 Yet, the Skilling court failed to 
illuminate these nuances for the jury, who found Skilling guilty of securities fraud 
and making false statements to auditors and found Lay guilty on all counts.94  
                                                
88 Id. at 17666:14-18 (“Government must prove . . . that each alleged omission of material fact was 
misleading because a Defendant failed to disclose material information that was necessary to make 
an allegedly false statement accurate or complete, and therefore, not misleading”). 
89 See Skilling Brief at 99; Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 552, 554-55 (5th Cir. 2007) (detailing the actual 
instruction and the portion of the proposed supplemental instruction enumerating forward-
looking statements, facts already known to the market, and non-specific puffery as “inherently not 
material”). 
90 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 231-32 (1988). 
91 Skilling 554 F.3d at 552. 
92 Basic, Inc. 485 U.S. at 231-32. 
93 See Skilling Brief at 95-104 (alleging reversible error in the trial court’s failure to properly 
instruct the jury on the legal immateriality of puffery). 
94 Skilling, 554 F.3d at 542. Lay died on July 5, 2006; therefore, his indictment was vacated and 
dismissed. U. S. v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870 (S.D. Tex. 2006).  
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On appeal, Skilling portrayed as reversible error the trial court’s refusal to 
“instruct the jury on accepted principles of materiality” especially as to puffery 95 
and the legal validity and accounting treatment of the alleged secret oral side 
deals,96 but did not challenge the rejection of his proposed supplemental 
instruction on GAAP.  In affirming Skilling’s convictions, the Fifth Circuit found 
that the allegedly immaterial puffery was more than puffery and provided 
sufficient evidence for conviction,97 that the trial court’s materiality instructions 
were close enough,98 and that Skilling had waived his objection to the lack of 
instruction on oral side deals by submitting the proposed instruction on May 10, 
2006, long after the court-imposed March 31, 2006 submission deadline.99  
Like most defendants in accounting-related cases, Lay and Skilling faced 
bad facts, complex and contradictory accounting standards, and inadequate law. 
But they also grappled with prosecutors intent on avoiding accounting standards. 
For example, at Causey’s post-trial sentencing hearing, Causey argued that his 
sentence should be reduced because he had helped convict Lay and Skilling by 
collaborating with ETF prosecutors to withhold potentially exculpatory 
accounting evidence: 
Had we gone to trial, we would have fought the GAAP issue on 
the land, on the sea, in the air, I think we would still be in court, 
still trying the case. I think everybody, particularly the 
government, was advantaged by that . . . it seemed like I was on 
the receiving end of hundreds of calls from both sides as to 
whether or not Rick Causey was going to be a witness for the 
defense or [the government]. 
                                                
95 554 F.3d at 551-55. 
96 Id. at 556; see also Skilling Brief at 111-12 (the proposed jury instruction stated, inter alia, 
“Written guarantees do affect the accounting treatment of sales transactions. Oral guarantees, whether 
legally enforceable or not, can but do not always affect the accounting treatment of sales transactions. Letters of 
comfort and verbal assurances not amounting to a guarantee or agreement do not affect the accounting treatment of 
sales transactions.”). 
97 Skilling, 554 F.3d at 554 (finding that “the statements were not immaterial as a matter of law”). 
98 Id. (finding that the court’s actual instructions “captured most of the substance of Skilling's 
proposed supplement and adequately explained ‘materiality’ to the jury”). 
99 Id. at 556. The proposed GAAP instruction was submitted on May 5, 2006 and would likely 
have suffered the same fate on appeal. The timing suggests that counsel may have initially been 
unaware of the accounting consequences of the alleged side deals. Id. 
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. . . I believe the defense . . . would have liked evidence before the 
jury that in the main, the accounting at Enron was consistent with 
GAAP based upon what was known at the time by the chief 
accounting officer. They didn't call him . . . the net effect was that 
the cooperation relationship that he had with the government 
kept the accounting case out of the Lay/Skilling trial, which I 
think was of inestimable value to the government . . . .100 
Prosecutor Ruemmler countered that “having a cooperating witness who is 
reluctant to acknowledge their own responsibility is not really of much use to the 
government at all.”101 Most significant to this discussion was Ruemmler’s 
admission of her deliberate strategy to avoid presenting serious accounting 
evidence to Skilling’s jury. 
E. U.S. v. Ebbers 
From late 2000 to early 2002, Bernard J. Ebbers, CEO of WorldCom, 
Inc.,102 orchestrated a series of accounting manipulations to prop up WorldCom’s 
stock price, trying to preserve collateral for his personal debts.103 The 
manipulations, which added billions of dollars to WorldCom’s publicly reported 
net income, included padding projected revenues from so-called “under-usage” 
penalties, recording as assets internet line leasing costs that WorldCom had 
customarily expensed, failing to deduct marketing commissions from revenues, 
and reversing cookie-jar reserves for income taxes.104  
As WorldCom’s financial hole deepened, Ebbers resigned and the SEC 
began investigating. In June 2002, the company publicly disclosed the worst of its 
accounting shenanigans105 in response to which which Ebbers’ was later 
                                                
100 Causey Transcript, supra note 1, at 11-13. 
101 Causey Transcript, supra note 1, at 22:6-8. If the government wants truth, it should insist that 
witnesses who believe themselves blameless say so. Id. 
102 U.S. v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007). 
103 Id. at 113-14. 
104 Id. at 114-16. 
105 Id. at 117. 
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criminally charged.106 However, despite a wealth of factual detail evincing 
accounting irregularities, the indictment alleged no GAAP violation.107  
At trial in 2005, a jury convicted Ebbers of securities fraud and willful 
false filings under 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), and 78ff.108 Ebbers appealed, 
arguing in part that the government should be required to prove that the disputed 
accounting violated GAAP because “where a fraud charge is based on improper 
accounting, the impropriety must involve a violation of GAAP, because financial 
statements that comply with GAAP necessarily meet SEC disclosure 
requirements.”109  
The Second Circuit disagreed, affirming Ebbers’ convictions, citing Simon 
for the proposition that “even where improper accounting is alleged, the statute 
requires proof only of intentionally misleading statements that are material,”110 
defining “intentionally misleading statement” as one “designed to affect the price 
of a security,”111 and holding that the government was not obligated “to prevail in 
a battle of expert witnesses” over technical GAAP compliance.112 Construing the 
term “misleading,” the court pointed to WorldCom’s undisclosed changes in 
revenue and cost accounting policies which falsely led investors to infer that 
Worldcom’s current reported revenues and costs had been calculated just as 
before.113 In this sense, whether the financial statements were misleading was not 
a function of the accounting principles followed but of the failure to disclose 
period-to-period changes in those principles. 
F. U.S. v. Rigas 
Adelphia Communications Company (Adelphia) was founded by John 
Rigas in the early 1950s, went public in 1986, and had grown into one of largest 
                                                
106 Id. at 117, 125. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 117. 
109 Id. at 125. 
110 Id. (citing U.S. v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970)).  
111 Id. Because “design” is manifestly a function of scienter and “material” is not a function of 
“design,” the court most likely meant the word “designed” to interpret “intentionally,” not 
“material”. Id. 
112 Id. at 126-27. 
113 Id. at 126. 
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cable TV systems in the United States by 2001.114 Between March 1998 and 
September 2001, Adelphia’s publicly disclosed bank borrowings grew six-fold to 
$5.4 billion.115 At the same time, on the advice of Adelphia’s audit firm, Deloitte 
& Touche,116 Adelphia’s financial statements did not disclose an additional $2.3 
billion owed, under a so-called “co-borrowing” arrangement, by other companies 
owned by the Rigas family for which Adelphia was contingently liable117 but did 
not expect to pay.118  
In August 2001, on the basis of only the publicly disclosed debt, Moody’s 
Investors Service labeled Adelphia one of the country’s most highly leveraged 
cable TV companies.119 On March 27, 2002, in response to the unraveling of 
Enron and ensuing changes to SEC policies, Adelphia first disclosed the $2.3 
billion in a press release announcing its 2001 annual financial results.120 That day, 
Adelphia’s stock closed down about 25 percent, at $20.39 per share, and was 
delisted in May 2002 at $1.16.121  
At the inception of the ensuing investigation, John Rigas and sons, 
Timothy and Michael, were indicted for securities fraud and conspiracy to 
                                                
114 U.S. v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1471 (2008). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. At trial, no evidence was adduced to suggest that John Rigas was involved in decisions 
about Adelphia’s disclosure of the contingent liabilities and no witness testified to any 
misstatement on any subject by John Rigas. See Joint Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 102 
[hereinafter Rigas Joint Brief], United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 05-cr-
3577), 2006 WL 1721265.   
117 Rigas, 490 F.3d at 212 n.2. According to relevant FASB GAAP (then and now), contingent 
liabilities, like guarantees of others’ indebtedness, must not be recorded (“recognized” or 
“accrued”) as liabilities on the balance sheet unless, at the balance sheet date, they are probable to 
occur and the amount can be reasonably estimated. FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 5 ¶ 8 [hereinafter SFAS No. 5] (2010). Footnote “disclosure” of 
unrecognized but “reasonably possible” contingencies is required, while disclosure of merely 
remote contingencies is optional, Id. at ¶ 10, except for guarantees of the indebtedness of others, 
which must be disclosed. Id. at ¶ 12. 
118 Rigas, 490 F.3d at 212 n.2 (reproducing the footnote in the March 27, 2002 press release that 
disclosed the $2.3 billion contingent liability and stated that Adelphia “does not expect . . . to 
repay the amounts borrowed”). 
119 Rigas, 490 F.3d at 213. 
120 Id. at 212 n.2. 
121 Id. at 212. 
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commit securities fraud.122 Paragraph 67 of the indictment alleged an apparent 
evidentiary cornerstone of the government’s case: “Pursuant to GAAP, Adelphia 
was required . . . to disclose the full amount of its joint and several liabilities 
under the Co-Borrowing Facilities in the notes accompanying its financial 
statements.”123 
Despite the indictment’s express invocation of GAAP, at trial, the 
government deliberately avoided it, offering no expert testimony or other 
evidence of actual GAAP requirements.124 Instead, the prosecution sought to 
prove that Adelphia’s failure to disclose the contingent liabilities prior to March 
27, 2002 was materially misleading in the Basic sense: that these contingencies 
would be significant in the mind of a reasonable investor.125 In essence, the 
government’s case replaced whatever GAAP might say with Simon’s mandate: 
Don’t mind GAAP. Just don’t mislead.  
The defense offered no GAAP evidence, perhaps assuming it unnecessary 
because the prosecution proved no GAAP violation. This strategy deprived the 
jury of evidence, if any, of the defendants’ good faith reliance on GAAP.126 In 
July 2004, the jury found John and Timothy Rigas guilty of securities fraud and 
conspiracy.127 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the government should have been 
required to introduce SFAS No. 5 into evidence and to call an accounting expert 
to explain it128 because, unlike in Simon, the Rigas prosecutors alleged “accounting 
malfeasance” controlled by a specific accounting rule.129 The Second Circuit 
upheld the convictions, citing Simon and Ebbers to the effect that violation of 
accounting standards was not an element of the charged securities fraud130 and 
                                                
122 Indictment at 29 [hereinafter Indictment], U.S. v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-
cr-1236), 2002 WL 32153610. 
123 Indictment at 29. 
124 See Rigas Joint Brief at 49. 
125 Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988). 
126 Rigas, 490 F.3d at 220 (holding that while GAAP may be relevant to a defendant's good faith 
effort to comply with GAAP or reliance upon an accountant's advice thereon may negate scienter, 
nevertheless, the statte alone establishes the elements of fraud). 
127 Id. at 211. 
128 Id. at 219-20.  
129 Id. at 220. 
130 Id. 
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that, even if the defendants had complied with GAAP, a jury could find that they 
had intentionally misled investors.131 Rigas thus reaffirmed and even expanded 
Simon’s doctrine of GAAP irrelevance to include financial statement fraud 
governed by specific accounting standards.132  
G. In Re Lehman Bros. Securities 
Just as in criminal cases, courts have disregarded FASB GAAP in notable 
civil ones. In re Lehman Bros. Securities & ERISA Litigation illustrates both the 
judiciary’s accounting expertise deficit and the folly of requiring mechanical, 
fairness-free adherence to prescriptive GAAP. The plaintiffs alleged that 
Lehman’s financial statements were misleading in that they violated SFAS No. 
140—which governed accounting for assets used as collateral in so-called “Repo 
105” transactions—because, in the absence of a “true sale at law” opinion from a 
U.S. law firm, Lehman treated quarter-end Repo 105 transactions as sales rather 
than as borrowings thereby causing the “repetitive, temporary, and undisclosed 
reduction” of Lehman’s “net leverage” indebtedness metric.133 In the plaintiffs’ 
view, a true-sale opinion from U.K. law firm Linklaters was insufficient to 
support sale treatment.134 The court disagreed, finding no SFAS No. 140 violation 
but that a jury might find that the statements violated the Second Circuit’s self-
concocted FASB GAAP “requirement that the [financial] statements as a whole 
accurately reflect the financial status of the company.”135  
One of the most striking aspects of the Lehman case was Lehman’s 
transoceanic manipulation of a bright-line, post-Enron, SOX-era accounting 
standard. SOX was supposed to prevent future Enrons. Yet, for Lehman, the 
bright lines of SFAS No. 140 and concomitant prohibitions against fair 
presentation overrides facilitated deception. The court responded by unilaterally 
rewriting GAAP in the image of Simon and the FASB quickly drew new bright 
                                                
131 Id. at 221. 
132 The court also inexplicably quoted what it called the “relevant part” of SFAS No. 5, Rigas, 490 
F.3d at 220 n.14, but omitted paragraph 8 thereof which explains how contingent liabilities should 
be recorded or disclosed depending on their likelihood. Id. 
133 In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 276-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
134 Id. at 278. 
135 In re Lehman Bros., 799 F. Supp. 2d at 279 n. 127 (misconstruing an AICPA private-company 
auditing standard as a 2008 accounting standard for public companies). 
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lines, amending SFAS 140 in a tacit admission that the old bright lines were 
misleading.136   
In another 2011 opinion, SEC v. Todd, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its 
continuing adherence to Simon in reinstating a civil fraud verdict137 against 
Gateway Incorporated’s CFO for recklessly misrepresenting Gateway’s year 2000 
revenues. The trial court had overturned the verdict as a matter of law in part 
because the SEC’s accounting expert, Professor Arnold (of Skilling fame), cited 
no GAAP proscribing the defendant’s recognition of revenue in the 
circumstances.138 The Ninth Circuit held that whether or not the disputed revenue 
technically complied with GAAP, the evidence supported the jury’s conclusion 
that its recognition was materially misleading.139 The SEC has similarly 
sidestepped GAAP in more than one hundred administrative cases since 1995.140 
H. Case law synthesis 
U.S. case law treats financial statements as an information portal through 
which preparers and auditors present selected factual assertions from which 
readers may choose in forming logical inferences about the company’s past 
performance and future prospects. Reports filed under Section 13 must be true 
and correct,141 must not be false or misleading,142 and negligence is sufficient to 
                                                
136 See STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 166: ACCOUNTING FOR 
TRANSFERS OF FINANCIAL ASSETS AN AMENDMENT OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 140 (Fin. 
Accounting Standards Bd. 2009); Justin Chircop, Paraskevi Vicky Kiosse & Ken Peasnell, Should 
Repurchase Transactions be Accounted for as Sales or Loans?, 26 ACCOUNTING HORIZONS 657, 663-66 
(2012) (describing Lehman’s Repo 105 accounting and responsive changes to FASB GAAP). 
137 SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). 
138 Id. at 1216. 
139 Id. at 1217 (citing U.S. v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1482 n.6 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Adherence to GAAP 
would obviously qualify as weighty exculpatory evidence; it does not, however, necessarily shield 
one from [ ] liability.”) (citing U.S. v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1978); Monroe v. 
Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1994))).  
140 See, e.g., In Re Sony Corporation and Sumio Sano, SEC Release No. 34-40305 (Aug. 5, 1998), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3440305.txt (fining Sony $1 million for falsely reporting its 
Pictures and Music Entertainment subsidiaries as one entertainment segment in GAAP-compliant 
financial statements); In Re The Coca-Cola Company, Securities Act Rel. 8569 at 8-9 (Apr. 18, 
2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8569.pdf (sanctioning Coca-Cola for failing to 
inform readers that its GAAP-compliant income statement masked unsustainable Japanese syrup 
sales).  For further information on side stepping of the GAAP, see Spreadsheet of Admin. Cases, 
(on file with the Author) (2015).   
141 U.S. v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1298 (2d Cir. 1991). 
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prove civil violation of Section 13(a).143 When the mix of facts presented in and 
omitted from financial statements can reasonably be expected to lead investors 
toward materially false inferences, the statements have been found misleading and 
therefore in violation of securities statutes or regulations.144  
GAAP compliance is not an element of civil or criminal claims or 
charges145 and is not a guarantee that financial statements are not misleading.146 
Financial statements that have not been proven to violate GAAP have 
nevertheless been found materially misleading.147 Yet, dicta suggest that proof of 
compliance with GAAP may be “very persuasive” evidence that audited financial 
statements are not materially misleading or, if they are misleading, that the 
preparers or auditors nevertheless published them in good faith.148 The legal 
application of GAAP and auditing standards is hampered by the fact that Courts, 
prosecutors and defense counsel often misconstrue or avoid them, as illustrated 
by Ebbers, Skilling, and Lehman.149 The fact and materiality of misleading statements 
                                                                                                                           
142 See SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1980).  
143 See SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
144 See, e.g., U.S. v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007) 
(pointing to failure to disclose changes in accounting policies as falsely leading investors to infer 
no such changes); U.S. v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 221 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding a jury verdict that 
failure to disclose contingent guarantee of a related party’s debt was materially misleading); SEC v. 
Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1213, 1217 (9th Cir. 2011) (upholding a jury verdict that revenue recorded 
on lease-back transactions structured to have zero cash-flow impact was misleading); U.S. v. 
Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 800-01 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (holding that 
omission of information about collateral underlying a receivable could mislead investors to over-
value the receivable). 
145 See, e.g., Rigas, 490 F.3d at 220. 
146 See, e.g., id. at 221. 
147 See, e.g., supra Part I (discussing Simon, 425 F.2d 796; U.S. v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 
2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, on other grounds, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5259 (2010); Ebbers, 458 F.3d 
110; Rigas, 490 F.3d. 208; Todd, 642 F.3d at 1217; In Re Sony Corporation and Sumio Sano, SEC 
Release No. 34-40305 (Aug. 5, 1998), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/3440305.txt; In Re 
The Coca-Cola Company, Securities Act Rel. 8569 at 8-9 (Apr. 18, 2005), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/33-8569.pdf). 
148 See Simon, 425 F.2d at 805. 
149 See Ebbers, 458 F.3d at 126. Similarly, a recent study found that federal judges complied in less 
than 14 percent of studied cases with a statutory requirement to certify that attorneys comply with 
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in all securities cases. M. Todd Henderson & 
William H. J. Hubbard, Do Judges Follow the Law? An Empirical Test of Congressional Control Over 
256 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16 
 
 
and omissions are treated as questions of fact amenable to expert testimony 
under FRE 702. While Supreme Court precedent constrains materiality to 
information objectively significant to a reasonable investor,150 some lower courts 
have subjectively redefined it as significant to an investor.151   
II. FAIR PRESENTATION CHRONICLE AND STANDARDS 
A. Debating Fair Presentation 
1.  Fair Presentation Chronicle 
The debate over the role and meaning of financial statement fair 
presentation, key historical inflection points of which are highlighted here,152 has 
been ongoing since at least January 1933, when NYSE President Richard Whitney 
asked listed companies to obtain outside audit opinions on whether their 1932 
balance sheets and income statements fairly presented their financial position and 
results; whether the accounts were fairly determined through “consistent application 
of the system of accounting regularly employed by the company”; and whether 
the company’s “system” conformed to “accepted accounting practices” and five 
broad principles which, endorsed by the American Institute of Accountants 
                                                                                                                           
Judicial Behavior (2 U. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 671, 2014), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377351. 
150 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 13–317, 2014 U.S. Lexis 4305, at ***42 
(Jun. 23, 2014) (citing Amgen v. Conn. Ret. & Trust Funds, 2013 U.S. Lexis 1862, at ***22 (2013)) 
(holding that materiality is an objective question in securities cases); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318, 1323 (2011) (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 
(1988) (defining materiality through the eyes of a reasonable investor)). 
151 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 62-72, 82-92 (discussing materiality as applied in U.S. v. 
Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009)). 
152 Details are chronicled elsewhere. See, e.g, Zeff 2007, supra note 8; Stephen A. Zeff, Arthur 
Andersen & Co. and the two-part opinion in the auditor's report: 1946-1962, 8 CONTEMPORARY ACCT. 
RESEARCH 448 (1992) [hereinafter Zeff 1992]; Zeff 1971, supra note 8. 
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(AIA),153 had “won fairly general acceptance” and thus deserved universal 
application.154  
In May 1933, Congress very quickly passed the Securities Act of 1933 
(Securities Act)155 ostensibly to “provide full and fair disclosure of the character 
of [covered] securities.”156 Commenting on the paucity of congressional debate 
over the Securities Act, one observer wrote, “There was virtually no dissent . . . 
[House Speaker Sam] Rayburn remarked he did not know whether the bill passed 
so readily because it was damned good or so damn incomprehensible.”157 
Hindsight suggests the latter. 
Section 19 authorized the FTC to prescribe related accounting 
methods.158 FTC regulations required registration statements to include a balance 
sheet and income statements distinguishing between recurring and non-recurring 
income.159 Statements were to be certified by an “independent public or certified 
accountant”160 to the effect that the statements therein were true and not 
                                                
153 Letter from Richard Whitney, President, NYSE, Jan. 31, 1933, in AUDITS OF CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTS, CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CO-OPERATION WITH 
STOCK EXCHANGES OF THE AIA AND THE COMMITTEE ON STOCK LIST OF THE NEW YORK 
STOCK EXCHANGE 13 (emphasis added), available at  
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1934_0121_AuditsCorporateT.pdf.  
[hereinafter CORRESPONDENCE]. 
154 Letter from AIA Special Committee to NYSE Committee on Stock List, Sep. 22, 1932, in 
CORRESPONDENCE at 7-9.  
155 Securities Act of 1933, H.R. 5480, 73d Cong. (1933), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1933_05_27_Securities_Act.pdf. 
[hereinafter “Securities Act”]. 
156 Securities Act, supra note 148, at preamble. 
157 Letter from Benjamin V. Cohen to James Landis, May 5, 1933, available at Papers, SECURITIES 
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION HISTORICAL SOCIETY, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1933_05_05_Cohen_to_Landis_t.pdf.  
158 Securities Act § 19(a) (1933). The power to set or “recognize” accounting standards in 
registration statements now resides with the SEC. Securities Act § 19(a) (2012), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/sa33.pdf.  
159 Securities Act, supra note 148, at § 7 and Schedule A, ¶¶ 25-26.  
160 Id. 
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misleading.161 In January 1934, J.M.B. Hoxsey, Executive Assistant to the NYSE 
Committee on Stock List, wrote as to a proposed audit opinion template, “[T]he 
Exchange . . . is not concerned with minor questions of form or with petty 
details, but with the substantial accuracy and fairness of accounts.”162 
The Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) followed.163 Arguing against 
proposed Section 18(b), which would empower the SEC to dictate accounting 
standards,164 George May wrote: “There is no dispensing with judgment in the preparation 
of accounts . . . In so far as principles of accounting are necessary . . . corporations 
should be allowed to exercise judgment provided that they recognize certain 
fundamental principles . . . definitely laid down and consistently followed.”165 The 
AIA added that “[u]niform financial statements simply will not solve the problem. 
They might look alike, but . . . would not mean the same things. Investors would 
be deceived, rather than protected, by such requirements.”166  
Nevertheless, accountants busily set about standardizing accounting 
principles and audit reports while conflating compliance and fair presentation. In 
1942, the SEC warned accountants that GAAP should not “blind us to the basic 
question, whether the financial statements performed the function of 
enlightenment, which is their only reason for existence.”167 One audit firm, 
                                                
161 FTC, Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Act of 1933, Art. 14-16 (Jul. 6, 1933) 
(emphasis added), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1933_0706_FTC_RulesRegs.pdf.   
162 Letter from J.M.B. Hoxsey to Edwin F. Chinlund, Chairman, Controllers Institute of America, 
Jan. 18, 1934, in CORRESPONDENCE at 30.   
163 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) § 4, H.R. 9323, 73d Cong. (1934), available 
at http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1934_06_06_Securities_Exchan.pdf.  
164 The accounting profession inexplicably did not object on the record to the grant of similar 
power to the FTC by Securities Act § 19.  
165 Memorandum from George O. May to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency 
4-5 (Mar. 10, 1934) (on file with author). May also argued that “broadly speaking, the shorter the 
[reporting] period the greater relatively becomes the possible margin of error . . . .” Id. at 5-7.  
166 Press Release, AIA (Mar. 11, 1934), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1930/1934_0311_ImpositionUniformT.pdf.  
167 In re Assoc. Gas & Elec. Co., 11 SEC 1058, August 4, 1942 quoted in Address by John C. 
Burton, “Fair Presentation: Another View,” Baruch College of the City University of New York at 
n.9 and accompanying text (Feb. 18, 1975), available at 
http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/library/alumni/online_exhibits/digital/saxe/saxe_1974/burton_75
.htm. See also Samuel H. Gruenbaum and Marc I. Steinberg, Accountants' Liability and Responsibility: 
Securities, Criminal and Commmon Law, 13 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 247, 263 (1980) (“Enlightenment 
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Arthur Andersen, took this warning to heart. By 1946, all Andersen audit 
certificates opined separately on fair presentation and conformity with GAAP.168  
In 1957, Andersen partners formally voted for separate fair presentation 
opinions,169 thereby triggering the 1950s equivalent of a blog war. AICPA 
Director of Research Carman G. Blough struck first. Referring scandalously to “a 
firm” (Andersen) who believed financial statements could conform with GAAP 
yet not present fairly,170 he decried this “most unfortunate” heresy and warned 
inscrutably that henceforth no one could challenge an auditor’s “fairness or his 
integrity, only his judgment.”171 Andersen partner Maurice E. Peloubet countered 
that equating “present fairly” with GAAP conformity was an abdication of 
professional responsibility.172 Yet, by late 1962, Andersen had capitulated,173 
primarily to win the audit of Houston-based Superior Oil Co.174 Forty years later, 
a similar capitulation to another Houston oil client would destroy the firm. 
Andersen’s retreat did not end the controversy, as the problem returned 
with vigor in the 1970s. In November 1972, the AICPA published Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 1 declaring that fairly presented financial 
statements must conform to GAAP and be materially not misleading.175 In July 
1973, the FASB was formed and authorized by the AICPA to promulgate 
                                                                                                                           
means more than mathematical or literal accuracy. Taken as a whole, financial statements must 
fairly present the financial status of a company.”). 
168 Zeff 1992, supra note 145, at 449. 
169 Id. at 453-55.  
170 Carman G. Blough, Implications of “present fairly” in the auditor’s report, J. ACCT., Mar. 1958 at 76. 
171 Id. 
172 Maurice E. Peloubet & Carman G. Blough, More about "present fairly" in the auditor's report, J. 
ACCT., May 1958 at 73-74. 
173 Zeff 1992, supra note 145, at 462. 
174 Superior Oil “expensed” drilling costs, whereas Andersen favored “capitalizing” or recording 
them as assets. Id. at 464.  
175 STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS (1975) [hereinafter SAS] NO. 1, § 511.01. The “not 
misleading” phrase suggests that SAS No. 1 may have been partly a reaction to the Second 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 
(1970). See Zeff 2007, supra note 8, at 5 (stating that in 1972 the AICPA’s Committee on Auditing 
Procedure, “probably influenced” by Simon, recommended deletion of “fairly” from the audit 
report). 
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accounting principles.176 In December, the SEC issued a non-rule policy, 
Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 150, announcing—without notice or 
comment—that the SEC would henceforth treat FASB-promulgated GAAP as 
authoritative and other GAAP as not so.177 A mere eighteen months later, SEC 
Chief Accountant John C. Burton opined that “[F]airness means more than 
following a set of specific rules, standards, and guidelines. Accounting cannot be 
viewed as a mechanistic process and remain either professional or 
communicative” and that fair presentation “cannot be defined by simple 
references to [GAAP] . . . . [T]he objectives of financial statements . . . have an 
important bearing on the meaning of ‘present fairly.’”178 
In 1975, the AICPA characterized GAAP as “relatively objective” 
because “auditors usually agree on their existence” but allowed that identification 
of GAAP “requires judgment.”179 In 1976, Arthur Andersen petitioned the SEC 
to revoke ASR No. 150 and then sued unsuccessfully to enjoin its enforcement.180  
Roughly twenty-five years later, with FASB GAAP bright lines running in 
all directions, cascading revelations of edgy accounting, sketchy corporate 
governance, and foolish business decisions drove Enron’s stock price below $1 
per share on November 28, 2001.181 The Enron collapse, along with similar 
catastrophes at Worldcom and Adelphia, prompted Congress to pass the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)182 on July 25, 2002.183  
                                                
176 See Ronald E. Large, Note, SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150: A Critical Analysis, 54 IND. L.J. 
317 at n.3, available at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol54/iss2/7.  
177 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150 2 (Dec. 20, 1973), available at 
http://www.sechistorical.org/collection/papers/1970/1973_1220_SECAccounting.pdf (quoting 
SEC Accounting Series Release No. 4 (1938) to the effect that “accounting practices for which 
there [is] no substantial authoritative support [are] presumed to be misleading”). 
178 Burton, supra note 160.   
179 SAS No. 5, ¶ 5 (1975) (“[T]here may be unusual circumstances in which the selection and 
application of specific accounting principles from among alternative principles may make the 
financial statements taken as a whole misleading.”). SAS No. 5 ¶ 9. 
180 See Large, supra note 169, at 317-19. 
181 See generally BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM (2003). 
182 107 CONG. REC. E1412 (Jul. 29, 2002) (speech of Rep. DeGette) (citing Enron, Worldcom, 
and Adelphia cases as the motivating force behind passage of H.R. 3763). 
183 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (codified in portions of 11, 15, 
18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-
107publ204/pdf/PLAW-107publ204.pdf. The enrolled H.R. 3763 was signed in the House of 
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The primary contributions of SOX to the fair presentation debate were 
more bright lines. Section 101 formed and misnamed the PCAOB;184  Section 108 
ordered the SEC to designate a setter of GAAP; and Sections 302, 304 and 906, 
further discussed in Part III, introduced civil and criminal financial statement 
certification regimes for CEOs and CFOs but not for auditors.  
In April 2003, with no notice or comment, the SEC published FR-70 
reaffirming the FASB as “a designated private-sector” setter of GAAP and 
declaring FASB standards “generally accepted” for purposes of SOX Section 
108.185  
In 2005, the FASB moved to supplant GAAP with FASB GAAP, 
proposing to end the AICPA’s GAAP custodianship186 and asserting that since 
“[T]he selection of [FASB GAAP] results in relevant and reliable financial 
information,” no enterprise may claim that its non-FASB-GAAP financial 
statements are GAAP compliant.187  
The FASB’s claim to a GAAP and fair presentation monopoly provoked 
an international firestorm. The Federation of European Accounting Experts 
(FEE) wrote: 
The proposed [FASB] statement does not address the relation 
between “hierarchy” and the “fair presentation” whereas [the] 
“fair presentation” principle can be seen as the overarching 
                                                                                                                           
Representatives on July 25, 2002. 107 CONG. REC. H5787 (daily ed. Jul. 25, 2002) (report of Mr. 
Trandahl, Clerk of the House). 
184 Because the PCAOB has authority over public company auditing standards, not accounting 
standards, the “A” in PCAOB should logically represent “auditing.” The Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, executed July 21, 2010, added nothing to the 
fair presentation debate, available at https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreetreform-cpa.pdf. 
185 FR-70, supra note 15. FR-70 is explicitly not an agency rule and has not been published in the 
Federal Register or Code of Federal Regulations. Id. See also Wanda A. Wallace, Commentary: With 
or without due process?, ACCT. TODAY, Nov. 26, 2007, n.p., available at 
http://www.accountingtoday.com/ato_issues/2007_21/25983-1.html (objecting to the SEC’s 
apparent violations of due process in issuing FR-70 and multiple SABs because of their 
deleterious impact on the quality of resulting financial information). 
186 The Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ¶ A10 (FASB 2005), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175821377716&blobheader=appl
ication%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.  
187 Id.  
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principle. Given the legal requirements for preparers and auditors 
to certify . . . whether the financial statements fairly present . . . we 
believe that the FASB should . . . provide requirements and 
guidance for the use of the term “fair presentation” in 
conjunction with US GAAP.188 
David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, agreed: 
. . . [W]e strongly believe that [GAAP] should . . . include a 
requirement for the enterprise to consider fair presentation . . . 
and provide guidance for making judgments about it. If literal 
compliance with the individual accounting and financial reporting 
standards would lead to misleading financial statements . . . the 
enterprise should depart from [them] . . . to achieve fair 
presentation.189  
The New York State Society of CPAs and its German equivalent lodged similar 
objections.190  No matter, the FASB and PCAOB forged ahead, effectively 
sidelining professional judgment in public companies’ choice of accounting 
principles.191  
                                                
188 Letter from Fédération des Experts Comptables Européens to FASB (Jul. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175817846735&blobheader=appl
ication%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (noting that the FASB’s move “leaves 
the impression that the application of US GAAP is a mechanical exercise”). 
189 Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, to FASB 1 (Jun. 27, 
2005), 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id&blo
bwhere=1175817846897&blobheader=application%2Fpdf.  
190 Letter from NYSSCPA to FASB 5 (Jun. 23, 2005), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobwhere=1175817847702&blobheader=appl
ication%2Fpdf&blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (asserting that “fair presentation” 
should extend to “circumstances in which . . . GAAP renders the financial statements 
misleading”); Letter from Institut der Wirtschaftsprüfer to FASB 3-6 (Jun. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobkey=id&blobnocache=true&blobwhere=117581784741
9&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&blobheadername2=Content-
Length&blobheadername1=Content-
Disposition&blobheadervalue2=722818&blobheadervalue1=filename%3D33162.pdf&blobcol=u
rldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs (arguing that the FASB proposal disregards legal realities and 
international consensus that strict GAAP adherence can violate fair presentation). 
191 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 162: THE HIERARCHY OF 
GENERALLY ACCEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES ¶¶ 3-5 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2008), 
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas162.pdf (divesting the AICPA of authority over GAAP 
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2.  Critiques of FASB-GAAP 
Criticism of FASB GAAP has been widespread and sustained. A 1996 
article argued that conformity with FASB GAAP “is almost a guarantee” that the 
financial statements are not fairly presented.192 Others have labeled FASB GAAP 
and the FASB’s effort to curtail use of AICPA Rule 203 politically motivated.193 
The critiques extend to even the most recent standards. For example, one public 
company CFO warned that an incoming FASB revenue standard will weaken the 
cash-flow predictive properties of revenue, increase fraud risk, and require “non-
GAAP measures . . . [to] assess the economic performance” of the company.194 
One legal commentator argued that “both GAAP and GAAS have serious 
flaws . . .” and “have facilitated and even encouraged the recent accounting 
scandals.”195 Another warned lawyers to stay out of negotiations between clients 
                                                                                                                           
hierarchy and prescribing sources of GAAP). See also generally STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 168 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2009) (categorizing the FASB 
CODIFICATION contents as “authoritative” GAAP and everything else as “non-authoritative”). 
[hereinafter SFAS No. 168].  
192 Ronald M. Mano, Mark Anderson, Vicki Nycum & Kevin McBeth, Fairly Presented, in Accordance 
With GAAP: What Does It Really Mean?, MGMT. ACCT., Jul. 1996,  at 44, 44.  
193 See Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Dumping Rule 203 exceptions: FASB’s troubling move, 
ACCT. TODAY, Jul. 11-24, 2005, at 12-13; Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Rule 203 exceptions 
could prevent future Enrons, ACCT. TODAY, Jul. 25-Aug. 7, 2005, at 14, 16-17; Paul B.W. Miller & Paul 
R. Bahnson, PEAP: Proof that FASB has faulty premise on 203, ACCT. TODAY, Aug. 8-21, 2005, at 14, 
16-17; Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, WYWAP: When GAAP meets Alice’s restaurant, ACCT. 
TODAY, Aug. 22-Sep. 4, 2005, at 12, 15 & 20; Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, POOP: Not 
what the world needs, but what it gets, ACCT. TODAY, Sep. 5-25, 2005, at 14, & 22; Paul B.W. Miller & 
Paul R. Bahnson, Newsflash: Is FASB ready to close its doors?, ACCT. TODAY, Sep. 26-Oct. 9, 2005, at 
14, 16-17. See also EUGENE E. COMISKEY, CHARLES W. MULFORD & JOSHUA A. THOMASON, THE 
POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELIMINATION OF LIFO AS A PART OF IFRS CONVERGENCE 
6-7 (Georgia Tech Financial Analysis Lab 2008), available at  
https://smartech.gatech.edu/handle/1853/26316 (illustrating distortions of tax-motivated LIFO 
accounting with examples like Tesoro Corp., whose LIFO-induced inventory understatement 
equaled 45 percent of 2007 shareholders’ equity). 
194 Letter from Doug French, VP Corporate Accounting & Financial Reporting, TELUS 
Corporation, Inc. to IASB 4 (Mar. 13, 2012) (Letter No. 283), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/CommentLetter_C/CommentLetterPage&cid=1218220137090
&project_id=2011-230&page_number=3. 
195 Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 
1097, 1108 (2007).  
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and auditors over FASB GAAP numbers because of their complexity and 
subjectivity.196 
Whether or not GAAP financial statements are by definition misleading, 
recent research suggests that GAAP is often used to mislead. A 2013 survey found 
that roughly 20 percent of firms “use discretion within GAAP” to misrepresent 
earnings by approximately 10 percent,197 with 60 percent of the manipulation 
increasing and 40 percent decreasing earnings.198 The study cited acquisition 
accounting, consolidation, and revenue recognition as frequent manipulation 
contexts199 and quoted one CFO who had “watched numerous managements 
earn big incentives” by booking larger-than-necessary acquisition-related reserves 
later used to juice earnings in subsequent periods.200 The same survey found most 
CFOs believe earnings quality would improve if regulators would issue fewer 
rules201 and allow “reporting choices” to “evolve from practice.”202 On the other 
hand, several cited fears of litigation to justify the current regime, while another—
                                                
196 William O. Fisher, Lawyers Keep Out: Why Attorneys Should Not Participate in Negotiating Critical 
Financial Numbers Reported by Public Company Clients, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1501 (2010). 
197 Dichev et al., supra note 2, at 3-4, 35-36. The survey asked, “From your impressions of 
companies in general, in any given year, what percentage of companies use discretion within 
GAAP to report earnings which misrepresent the economic performance of the 
business?__%.[sic]” Id. at 35, 68. See also CENTER FOR AUDIT QUALITY, MAIN STREET INVESTOR 
SURVEY DATA, Q10 at 6 (2012) (reporting that from 2007 to 2012 the percentage of investors 
who claim “quite a bit” or “a great deal” of confidence in audited financial information fell from 
38 to 28, while the share of those claiming “very little” or no confidence grew from 16 to 25). 
198 Dichev et al., supra note 2, at 44.  
199 Id. at 44-45. 
200 Id. at 44 (“[They [the reserves] are set up at the time of the acquisition . . . but they’re an 
estimate at that point in time. When the future happens then you take charges against that . . . it’s 
going to be (imprecise) but whenever I have seen this it was always less than what got set up, so it 
got released into favorable earnings . . . [and] did impact the earnings and sometimes for . . . two-
three years because they were big acquisitions.”) 
201 Id. at 29. 
202 Id. at 29-31 (“Almost every interviewed CFO regretted the decline of the earlier bottom-up 
system of developing GAAP . . . ,” including one who said, “The rules are so prescriptive that 
they override and supersede your judgment, and you end up with things that don’t really reflect 
the economic substance of the transaction, but you have to account for it in the way that’s 
described by the rules.”). See also S.P. Kothari, Karthik Ramanna, Douglas J. Skinner, Implications 
for GAAP from an analysis of positive research in accounting, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 246, 272 (2010) (“If 
capture theory [of accounting standards regulation] is correct, the policy implication is to stop 
producing de jure GAAP and return to a de facto GAAP that arises from accounting practices with 
long-run survival value.”). 
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apparently unaware of Jeff Skilling’s and John Rigas’ ill-advised reliance on 
compliance—observed, “We live in a litigious society so people would prefer to 
have prescriptive guidance, so they can say they followed the rules.”203  
A trio of recent studies concluded that for predicting future operating 
cash flows, current FASB GAAP earnings are inferior to current operating cash 
flows,204 implying that thousands of pages of FASB rules dedicated to measuring 
“earnings” provide no incremental information value.   
Another study noted that increasingly detailed SEC, FASB and PCAOB 
rules have reduced neither the number nor severity of accounting scandals. The 
study opined that standards-setting is now a “pseudoscience” governed by 
ideology and politics,205 and it recommended that accounting methods should be 
developed, in part, through decentralized field testing of innovations in different 
countries rather than imposed by regulatory fiat.206Another author decried 
                                                
203 Dichev et al., supra note 2 at 31 (emphasis added). See also Glen L. Gray, Jerry L. Turner, Paul J. 
Coram, & Theodore J. Mock, Perceptions and Misperceptions Regarding the Unqualified Auditor’s Report by 
Financial Statement Preparers, Users, and Auditors, 25 ACCT. HORIZONS 659, 670 (2011) (finding that 
non-professional investors “never use the financial statements,” preferring The Value Line 
Investment Survey or the Motley Fool as “important inputs to investment decisions.”). But see 
Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, SEC, Lessons from the Financial Crisis for Financial Reporting, 
Standard Setting and Rule Making (Nov. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch111709klc.htm (asserting that the stability of 
financial markets depends on the transparency of financial statements). 
204 Kenneth S. Lorek & G. Lee Willinger, Multi-Step-Ahead Quarterly Cash-Flow Prediction Models, 25 
ACCT. HORIZONS 71, 73 (2011) (finding cash-flow-based quarterly prediction models superior 
because of “noisy” subjective estimates embedded in FASB GAAP earnings); Baruch Lev, Siyi Li 
& Theodore Sougiannis, The usefulness of accounting estimates for predicting cash flows and earnings, 15 REV. 
ACCT. STUD. 779, 783 (2010) (“accounting estimates do not improve the prediction of future cash 
flows”); Kenneth S. Lorek & G. Lee Willinger, New evidence pertaining to the prediction of operating cash 
flows, 32 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 1, 3, 13-14 (2009) (finding annual cash flow-based 
prediction models “significantly more accurate” than earnings-based models). But see Myungsun 
Kim & William Kross, The Ability of Earnings to Predict Future Operating Cash Flows Has Been 
Increasing—Not Decreasing, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 753, 754-755 (2005) (relying on algorithmic 
approximations of operating cash flows in finding that “the ability of earnings to forecast future 
(operating) cash flows” generally increased between 1973 and 2000). 
205 Sudipta Basu, How Can Accounting Researchers Become More Innovative?, 26 ACCT. HORIZONS 851, 
858 (2012). 
206 Id. 
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GAAP’s role as the only information source for decision makers207 in part 
because GAAP’s mathematical linearity cannot reflect non-linear market 
realities.208  
3.  Legal Misconceptions 
Case law and legal commentary reveal fundamental misconceptions about 
SEC rules and accounting. A 1977 law review note cited the AICPA Accounting 
Principles Board (APB) as authority for the erroneous assertion that GAAP 
financial statements “disclose the current economic status of an enterprise.”209 
The reality? In markets where asset values constantly fluctuate, historical cost-
based GAAP statements published weeks or months after the fact cannot 
possibly reveal “current economic status.”210    
In 2006, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals—which, among all U.S. 
courts, should be most knowledgeable in this area—propagated the following 
quartet of financial reporting fallacies in affirming the convictions of former 
WorldCom CEO Bernie Ebbers: (a) all misleading financial statements violate 
GAAP, (b) GAAP admits that application of some GAAP rules may produce 
misleading financial statements, (c) GAAP states that all misleading financial 
statements fail to present fairly, and (d) GAAP requires that financial statements 
“accurately reflect the financial status of the company.”211  
In Skilling, two defense accounting experts wrongly characterized as 
binding law SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 on materiality. The 
                                                
207 John Christensen, Accounting Errors and Errors of Accounting, 85 ACCT. REV. 1827, 1828, 1833-36 
(2010). 
208 Id. at 1830-33.   
209 Note, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles: Instruction H(f) and the Preferability Issue, 11 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 229, 229 n.5 (1977).  
210 See Charles E. Jordan, Stanley J. Clark & Gwen R. Pate, The Debate over Fair Value Reporting, 
CPA J., Feb. 2013, at 46. Fewer assets are reported at historical cost today than in 1977 but 
historical cost remains the default. Id. (asserting that fair value accounting “will likely become the 
primary reporting basis” in future). See also Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 101 
(1995) (citing  ROBERT S. KAY & D. GERALD SEARFOSS, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND 
AUDITING 7 (2d ed. 1989)) (finding that GAAP “do[es] not necessarily parallel economic reality” 
and is not a “lucid,” “encyclopedic” or “single-source accounting rulebook”). 
211 United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007).  The court 
also stated without citation to authority, “Good faith compliance with GAAP will permit 
professionals who study the firm and understand GAAP to accurately assess the financial 
condition of the company.” Id. at 125. 
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reality is that like all SABs, SAB No. 99 reveals only the non-binding opinions of 
SEC staff.212 
In 2007, an attorney with considerable accounting and securities law 
expertise cited a prominent securities litigator who, in turn, misquoted SOX 
Section 103(a)(3) for the proposition that the PCAOB was created to “regulate 
and discipline the accounting industry” and is now the “ultimate arbiter of 
accounting standards.”213 In fact, Section 103(a)(3) authorizes the PCAOB to 
write and enforce only auditing (not accounting) standards and these are applicable 
only to audits and auditors of SEC registrants.214 That so many well-trained minds 
could harbor such fundamental errors suggests that the SEC’s FASB-GAAP-
based financial reporting model misleads those it purports to inform. 
B. Fair Presentation Standards 
While federal courts play a role in judging the overall fairness of financial 
statements, the primary regulatory players are the SEC, PCAOB, AICPA, FASB, 
and IASB, whose current standards are discussed below. 215 
1.  AICPA 
In the United States, AICPA auditing standards apply only to audits that 
are performed by AICPA members and are not under PCAOB jurisdiction.216  
                                                
212 Skilling Transcript at 16512, 16849-16850. Jerry Arnold testified, “[S]enior [SEC] accounting 
staff put out interpretations of how things should be done. Those are binding, and they label them 
SABs . . . This is Number 99. . . .” Id. at 16512. Walter Rush testified that SAB No. 99 “is an 
important rule.” Id. at 16849. SABs are drafted without public notice, comment, or Commission 
vote and are, therefore, not binding. See Kurt S. Schulzke, Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Pier Luigi 
Marchini, Lexis Nexus Complexus: Comparative Contract Law and International Accounting Collide in the 
IASB–FASB Revenue Recognition Exposure Draft, 46 Vand. J. Trans. L. 515, 524 (2013). 
213 Mark, supra note 188, at 1109 (citing Neil H. Aronson, Preventing Future Enrons: Implementing the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 127, 133 (2002)); see also Arthur Acevedo, 
Responsible Profitability? Not on My Balance Sheet!, 61 CATH. U.L. REV. 651, 690 (2012) (erroneously 
attributing the power of “accounting legislation” to the PCAOB). SOX Section 108, entitled 
“Accounting Standards,” creates a rubric under which the FASB’s designation as a U.S. 
accounting standards setter was nearly inevitable. SOX § 108. 
214 SOX § 101(a) and (c).  
215 FASB and IASB merely set norms, leaving enforcement to adopting governments. SEC, 
PCAOB, DOJ, AICPA and state agencies enforce these norms in the United States. Outside the 
United States, enforcers and enforcement vary. This article groups the PCAOB together with 
AICPA and FASB because of the PCAOB’s quasi-non-governmental status. 
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According to section 200 of the AU-C, audits should deliver “an opinion by the 
auditor on whether the financial statements are presented fairly, in all material 
respects, in accordance with an applicable financial reporting framework,”217 thus 
signaling acceptance of multiple frameworks.  
AU-C § 320 defines materiality as dependent on user information needs 
with the (highly idealistic) caveats that users (a) have a “reasonable knowledge of 
business, economic activities, and accounting and a willingness to study the 
information in the financial statements with reasonable diligence” and (b) “make 
reasonable economic decisions” based on the financial statements, while (c) 
appreciating the uncertainty inherent in such information.218 This nuanced 
definition of materiality could hardly be more different from that propounded to 
the Skilling jury. It is also  missing entirely from AICPA and PCAOB standard 
audit reports.219  
                                                                                                                           
216AICPA Code, ET Appendix A, available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/CodeofConduct/Pages/et_appendixes.aspx. 
(authorizing the PCAOB and AICPA Auditing Standards Board to issue auditing standards for 
audits of SEC registrants and non-SEC registrants, respectively). Financial statements are generally 
not required of non-registrants. However, of 4,004 small businesses recently surveyed, 496 used 
financial statements compiled, reviewed, and/or audited by an accountant. Kristian D. Allee & 
Teri Lombardi Yohn, The Demand for Financial Statements in an Unregulated Environment: An 
Examination of the Production and Use of Financial Statements by Privately Held Small Businesses, 84 ACCT. 
REV. 1, 8 (2009).  
217 CLARIFIED STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS, AU-C § 200.04 (Am. Inst. of Certified 
Pub. Accountants  2014) (emphasis added). See also AU-C § 700.13 (2014) (restating the elements 
of § 200.04 as mandatory requirements); AU-C § 700.35 (2014) (requiring “unmodified” audit 
opinions to expressly state that the financial statements are presented fairly.) A “financial 
reporting framework” guides the “measurement, recognition, presentation, and disclosure of all 
material items appearing in the financial statements,” like FASB GAAP, IFRS, or other “special 
purpose” frameworks. AU-C § 200.14. A fair presentation framework is one that recognizes extra-
framework disclosures or outright departures as sometimes necessary to achieve fair presentation. 
Id. The AICPA recently promulgated “clarified” auditing standards designated “AU-C.” AICPA, 
Clarified Statements on Auditing Standards, available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/Pages/clarifiedSAS.aspx. This Article 
identifies PCAOB and AICPA auditing standards as “PCAOB AU,” “AICPA AU,” “AU,” or 
“AU-C,” as context requires. PCAOB auditing standards are available at 
http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/default.aspx.  
218 AU-C § 320 
219 See AICPA, Illustration 1 —An Auditor’s Report on Consolidated Comparative Financial Statements 
Prepared in Accordance With Accounting Principles Generally Accepted in the United States of America, AU-C 
§ 700.A58, available at 
http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/AuditAttest/DownloadableDocuments/AU-C-
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The phrase “fair presentation” appears more than fifty times in AU-C § 
200 and AU-C § 700 combined, yet its meaning is left mostly to the reader’s 
imagination. For example, AU-C § 700 states that auditors “should also” consider 
“the overall presentation, structure, and content of the financial statements,” 
and—with a circular flourish—whether the statements and notes “represent the 
underlying transactions and events in a manner that achieves fair presentation.”220  
AICPA Rule 203, while not expressly citing fair presentation, authorizes 
auditors to approve departures from FASB GAAP if the auditor “can 
demonstrate that due to unusual circumstances the financial statements or data 
would otherwise have been misleading.”221 In 2012, Interpretation 203.02 added 
that “when the literal application of GAAP would have the effect of rendering 
financial statements misleading . . . the proper accounting treatment is that which will 
render the financial statements not misleading.”222 Presumably, “proper 
accounting” is distinct from “generally accepted,” “generally regarded,” and 
“fairly presented.” 
AICPA Rule 203 and Interpretation 203.02 show that the AICPA believes 
GAAP is sometimes incapable of producing financial statements that are not 
misleading. An SEC Chief Accountant, a Comptroller General of the United 
States, numerous accounting scholars, scores of public company CFOs, and the 
FEE agree.223 Some private company auditors, who are not subject to PCAOB 
strictures, sometimes rely on Rule 203 to depart from FASB GAAP where 
compliance would otherwise produce misleading financial statements.224 
Discrediting the limitations of Rule 203.02, Rule 203.05 expressly 
authorizes “financial reporting frameworks other than GAAP” including 
jurisdictional variations of IFRS, accounting frameworks prescribed by contract, 
                                                                                                                           
00700.pdf; PCAOB, Reports on Audited Financial Statements, PCAOB AU § 508.08(a)-(j) (1996), 
available at http://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AU508.aspx. 
220 AU-C § 700.17.  
221 AICPA Rule § 203.01 (2012). 
222 AICPA Rule § 203.02 (2012). (emphasis added). 
223 See Miller & Bahnson, supra note 186; ZEFF 2007; FEE, supra note 181; Walker, supra note 182; 
Dichev et al., supra note 2.  
224 Interview with the managing partner of a large accounting firm based in the southeastern 
United States that audits only non-public companies (November 2014).   
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or “any other comprehensive basis of accounting.”225 GAAP either is or is not the 
only “not misleading” accounting framework. AICPA Rule 203.05 says not, that 
even non-GAAP accounting can be “not misleading,” and that accountants are 
obligated to find and use principles—in or out of GAAP—that do not mislead. 
This, in essence, is Simon.    
2.  PCAOB 
The PCAOB requires public company auditors to opine on whether the 
financial statements prepared by management226 “present fairly, in all material 
respects, an entity's financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.”227 On paper, the 
PCAOB defines “present fairly” to mean that 
(a) the accounting principles selected and applied have general 
acceptance; (b) the accounting principles are appropriate in the 
circumstances; (c) the financial statements [and] notes, are 
informative of matters that may affect their use, understanding, 
and interpretation . . .; (d) the information presented . . . is 
classified and summarized in a reasonable manner, that is, neither 
too detailed nor too condensed . . .; and (e) the financial 
statements reflect the underlying transactions and events in a 
manner that presents the financial position, results of operations, 
and cash flows stated within a range of acceptable limits, that is, 
limits that are reasonable and practicable to attain in financial 
statements.228   
                                                
225 AICPA Rule § 203.06 (2012).   
226 PCAOB AU § 508.08(c) (2013). Recently proposed revisions to the standard audit report do 
not address the fair presentation issues raised in this Article. See PCAOB, RELEASE NO. 2013-005, 
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT ON AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS WHEN THE AUDITOR 
EXPRESSES AN UNQUALIFIED OPINION (2013), available at 
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Pages/Docket034.aspx. .  
227 PCAOB AU § 411.01 (2013).  But see PCAOB AU § 508.08(h) (2013). These two provisions 
seem to conflict over the meaning of generally accepted accounting principles. Section 508.08(h) 
requires U.S. GAAP; section 411.01 allows any GAAP with “country of origin” disclosure. 
228 PCAOB  AU § 411.04. The PCAOB’s definition was taken verbatim from former AICPA AU 
§ 411 which was withdrawn in 2008. See PCAOB, Release No.  2008-001, EVALUATING 
CONSISTENCY OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, available at 
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket023/PCAOB_Release_No._2008-001_--
_Evaluating_Consistency.pdf.  
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Thus, consistent with section 320 of the AICPA’s Clarified Statements on 
Auditing Standards, the PCAOB—while head-faking in the direction of “use” or 
“user needs”—requires auditors to evaluate fair presentation without direct 
reference to financial statement objectives.  
Here, it bears emphasis that whether a financial statement is misleading is 
a function of user needs and expectations. For example, equity investors and 
lenders have different risk-reward profiles and need different information to 
make investing and lending decisions. Similarly, equity investors themselves differ 
in their appetites for risk.  
Creating a single set of financial statements that meets the needs of all of 
these user groups may be possible and, if so, would require an understanding of 
the inferences that members of each group might reasonably draw from 
information that could be included in or excluded from the financial statements 
coupled with seasoned professional judgment. Yet, despite the endorsement of 
professional judgment implicit in “general acceptance,” “appropriate in the 
circumstances,” and “range of acceptable limits,” the PCAOB insists that auditors 
find fair presentation exclusively within the GAAP framework without which 
“the auditor would have no uniform standard for judging the presentation of 
financial position.”229  
3.  FASB 
FASB Statements of Financial Accounting Concepts articulate principles 
that ostensibly guide the FASB in developing the FASB GAAP now found in the 
Codification.230 However, the Codification itself contains no explicit fair 
presentation requirement and offers no overall purpose or objective of financial 
statements. None of the Codification’s six cursory mentions of fair presentation 
addresses financial statements in general. Rather, each is industry or transaction-
specific. The phrase “present fairly” appears three times, each implying that 
financial statements should present fairly without ever clearly saying so or 
assigning responsibility. The term “misleading” appears eleven times—including 
three times preceded by “not”— but never in connection with the financial 
statements as a whole. 
                                                
229 PCAOB AU § 411.03.  
230 FASB § 105-10-05 (2014). . 
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In contrast to the Codification’s murkiness regarding fair presentation, 
FASB Concepts Statement No. 8 (Concepts No. 8)231 and its identical IASB twin, 
the IASB Conceptual Framework (Framework),232 offer a measure of clarity. 
While not outright defining fair presentation, they prescribe financial statements 
that are useful in making decisions about providing resources to the reporting 
entity233 where “useful” means helpful in assessing “the amount, timing, and 
uncertainty of . . . future net cash inflows.”234 Others have reduced this mouthful 
to the acronym “AAATUC”.235 Useful information must also be relevant and must 
faithfully represent236 economic substance over legal form,237 a combination that 
Concepts No. 8 roughly equates to fair presentation.238 Relevance, which includes 
materiality,239 implies predictive or confirmatory value.240  
Accountants might be expected to apply Concepts No. 8 to actual 
financial statements. However, they typically do not for at least two reasons. First, 
no direct measure of AAATUC currently exists.241 Second, the FASB, PCAOB, 
and SEC prohibit the use of concepts statements by practicing accountants. For 
example, in Concepts No. 8, the FASB admits that FASB GAAP may violate 
                                                
231 FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 8 [hereinafter Concepts No. 
8] (Sept. 2010), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176157498129&acceptedD
isclaimer=true.  
232 See Id. at ¶¶ QC3, QC35-39. Concepts No. 8 was jointly developed by FASB and IASB in part 
to “serve the public interest by providing structure and direction to financial accounting and 
reporting to facilitate the provision of unbiased financial and related information”. Id. 
233 Id. at ¶ OB2. 
234 Id. at ¶ OB3. As elegant as Concepts No. 8 sounds, it sets a rather low performance bar: 
compared to zero information, any additional information could be described as “useful.” 
235 Paul B.W. Miller & Paul R. Bahnson, Continuing the Normative Dialog: Illuminating the 
Asset/Liability Theory, 24 ACCT. HORIZONS 419, 431 (2010). 
236 Concepts No. 8 ¶ QC5. 
237 Id. at ¶¶ QC12, BC3.26. 
238 Id. at ¶ BC3.44. 
239 Id. at ¶ QC11. 
240 Id. at ¶ QC7. “[I]nformation need not be a prediction or forecast to have predictive value [but 
may be] employed by users in making their own predictions.” Id. at ¶ QC8. 
241 See Miller & Bahnson, supra note 228, at 431 (noting that while AAATUC cannot be directly 
measured, fair market values may be used to estimate it because they are “empirically observable 
and represent a consensus valuation” by independent parties).  
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principles contained in concepts statements but warns practitioners not to use 
such inconsistencies to justify overriding FASB GAAP to achieve fair 
presentation.242 Federal courts, unaware or dismissive of the concepts statements 
embargo, have frequently cited them as binding GAAP authority.243  
4.  IASB 
The IASB alternative to FASB GAAP, IFRS, is currently being 
considered by the SEC for public U.S. companies.244 More than 450 non-U.S. 
companies already file IFRS statements with the SEC.245 In contrast to FASB 
GAAP, IFRS expressly requires fair presentation,246 which IFRS defines as “the 
faithful representation of the effects of transactions, other events and conditions 
in accordance with” the Framework.247  
While IFRS compliance is presumed to achieve fair presentation,248 IAS 1 
paragraph 19 requires IFRS departures in the “extremely rare circumstances” in 
which compliance “would be so misleading [as to] conflict with the objective of 
financial statements” prescribed by the Framework.249 Thus, IFRS contrasts with 
                                                
242 Concepts No. 8 n.p. (a “Concepts Statement does not establish U.S. GAAP . . . [and] is not 
intended to invoke application of [AICPA] Rule 203”). 
243 A Sep. 5, 2013 search of the LexisNexis All Federal Courts database for “Statements of 
Financial Accounting Concepts” produced 66 separate entries. See, e.g., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 
2000) (citing FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 2, ¶ 125 (1980)); 
S.E.C. v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) (referring to defendants’ citation to FASB, 
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6 as FASB authority on revenue 
recognition); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 278 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Statement of the SEC, 
Amicus Curiae, in Support of Neither Side at 3 (quoting FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 5, ENTERPRISES 15-16,  ¶ 22 (Dec. 1984)); Higginbotham v. Baxter 
International, Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 758 n.+ (7th Cir. 2007) (citing FASB, STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 6).  
244 See Michael Rapoport, New SEC Chief Accountant Weighing Switch to Global Accounting Rules, WALL 
ST. J. , Nov. 6, 2014, available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/new-sec-chief-accountant-
weighing-switch-to-global-accounting-rules-1415305697.  
245 Paul Beswick, SEC Chief Accountant, Remarks at the 32nd Annual SEC and Financial 
Reporting Institute Conference (May 30, 2013). 
246 IAS 1 ¶ 15 (IASB 2012).   
247 Id. 
248 Id.  
249 IAS 1 ¶ 19 (2012)  
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FASB GAAP, first, in that IFRS compliance is expressly tied to financial 
statement objectives while FASB GAAP compliance is not, and second, in that 
PCAOB and FASB standards flatly prohibit fair presentation departures from 
FASB GAAP, whereas IAS 1 requires departures from IFRS when necessary to 
avoid misleading readers. While the Framework’s objectives have been criticized 
as so broad as to render paragraph 19 toothless, 250 the equivalent “true and fair 
view” override has long been a statutory standard of financial reporting in the 
United Kingdom, as discussed in Part III. 
III. FAIR PRESENTATION STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
In the United States, the fair presentation of financial statements is 
supported, if at all, by a complex, often internally inconsistent fabric of statutes 
and regulations. The central threads are summarized in Part III, together with the 
statutory scheme in the United Kingdom. 
A. Statutes 
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes civil liability for material 
misstatements and omissions in registration statements,251 which are required 
prior to the public offering of securities. Thereafter, section 13 of the Exchange 
Act prescribes periodic reporting requirements.252 Sections 30A253 and 13(b)(2) of 
the Exchange Act, the so-called “accounting provisions” of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA),254 require public companies to (a) keep books that 
accurately and fairly reflect transactions,255 and (b) maintain internal accounting 
controls to ensure that the financial statements comply with GAAP and other 
                                                
250 See Christopher Nobes, The importance of being fair: An analysis of IFRS regulation and practice- a 
Comment, 39 ACCT. & BUS. RES. 415, 420 (2009). Nobes’ view finds some support in the rarity of 
reported public company IAS ¶ 19 overrides, now totaling two cases. Id. at 421-423 (discussing 
National Express Group PLC’s 2005, 2006 & 2007 financial statements and Société Générale SA’s 
2007 financials).  
251 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2014). Section 12(a)(2) imposes similar liability for untrue statements or 
omissions of material facts in prospectuses or oral communications. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (2014). 
252  15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2014). 
253 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2014). 
254 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2014). 
255 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
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criteria.256 Knowing falsification of records or circumvention of controls triggers 
civil and criminal liability.257   
SOX Sections 302 and 906 distinguish financial reporting reliability from 
GAAP compliance. SOX Section 302 requires a public company’s CEO and CFO 
to (a) certify that each annual and quarterly report contains no material 
“misleading” factual misstatement or omission258 and that the financial statements 
“fairly present in all material respects” the registrant’s financial condition, 
operating results, and cash flows;259(b) acknowledge responsibility for the 
registrant’s disclosure controls and internal controls over financial reporting; and 
(c) certify that they have designed the internal controls “to provide reasonable 
assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of 
financial statements for external purposes in accordance with [GAAP].”260  
SOX Section 906 requires both CEOs and CFOs to certify that periodic 
reports containing financial statements comply with section 13(a) of the 
Exchange Act and fairly present, in material respects, the issuer’s financial 
condition and results of operations.261 On paper, the fines and prison time 
imposed for erroneous certification are severe. 262 However, to date, no reported 
case has applied these penalties, though the possibility of such may have induced 
defendants to settle. In addition, under SOX Section 304, officers of issuers that 
publish accounting restatements due to material noncompliance with SEC rules 
must disgorge incentive compensation and gains from sales of issuer stock 
                                                
256 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). 
257 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5). See, e.g., Brown v. U.S., 571 F.3d 492, 494 (5th Cir. 2009) (denying 
Merrill Lynch-employee defendants’ motion to dismiss their indictment for conspiracy to falsify 
Enron’s books in connection with a Nigerian barge deal). 
258 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(2) (2014).  
259 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(3); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13(a)-14(a), 240.15d-14(a) (2014); 17 C.F.R. § 
229.601(b)(31)(i) (2014) (mandating the exact contents of the certifications required by 17 C.F.R. 
240.13a-14(a) and 240.15d-14(a)). 
260 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(4); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(31)(i). SOX does not define reliability. 
261 18 U.S.C. § 1350(a)-(b) (2014). The SEC rule requiring SOX section 906 certifications is 17 
C.F.R. § 240.13a-14(b). 
262 Mere “knowing” certification of non-compliant statements yields up to 10 years in prison and 
$1,000,000 in fines, whereas “willful” false certification yields up to 20 years and $5,000,000. 18 
U.S.C. § 1350(c).  
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received during the twelve months following the original publication of the 
erroneous financial information.263 
Securities fraud is prohibited under both section 17 of the Securities Act 
and section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the 
Securities Act prohibit material untrue factual statements, misleading factual 
omissions, and other behavior that would operate as a fraud upon a purchaser, in 
connection with an offer or sale of a security.264 Similarly, section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act prohibits the use of any manipulative or deceptive device in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.265 The scope of section 10(b) 
has been established in part by SEC Rule 10b-5, whose central theme is that 
financial statements must not be materially misleading.266 Willful and knowingly 
false and misleading statements made in violation of the Exchange Act or any 
regulation thereunder are punishable by up to 20 years in prison and fines up to 
$5,000,000.267  
B. Regulations  
Securities disclosure statutes are implemented in part through reports that 
registrants must submit periodically to the SEC. Domestic issuers268 must file 
periodic, quarterly, and annual reports269 on Forms 8-K,270 10-Q,271 and 10-K.272 
Foreign private issuers (FPIs), 273  which report annually on Form 20-F274 and 
                                                
263 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2014). 
264 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2)-(3) (2014).  
265 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2014). 
266 See 17 C.F.R. 240-10b-5. 
267 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2014). 
268 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (2014). “Security,” for purposes of federal securities law, is defined in 15 
U.S.C. §§ 77b(1),  78c(10).  
269 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a). 
270 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2014). Form 8-K is used to report material events or transactions 
arising between 10-Q and 10-K filing deadlines. 
271 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2014). 
272 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2014). 
273 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (2014) (defining FPIs). 
274 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f  (2014) (requiring FPIs to file Form 20-F within six months of fiscal year 
end).  
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“currently” on Form 6-K,275 have no quarterly obligation. SEC regulations are 
internally conflicted over whether and to what extent financial statements filed 
with these forms must comply with GAAP or be fairly presented. SEC Rule 
210.4-01(a)(1) presumes that non-GAAP financial statements are misleading or 
inaccurate despite any mitigating footnote or other disclosures,276 but GAAP is 
not clearly defined by statute or regulation. Indeed, Form 20-F financial 
statements may be prepared using IFRS, FASB GAAP, or any other 
comprehensive set of accounting principles.277 Similarly, SEC FR-70 does not 
explicitly derecognize other standards as “not GAAP”. Thus, while non-GAAP 
accounting is presumed “misleading or inaccurate,” FASB GAAP is not 
presumed accurate, not misleading, or the only GAAP available.  
SEC regulations do not require external auditors to opine on fair 
presentation or on compliance with GAAP. Rather, they must offer only an 
“opinion . . . in respect of the financial statements . . . and the accounting 
principles and practices reflected therein”278 and their consistent application. This 
requirement differs markedly from the SOX certifications required of CEOs and 
CFOs.  
Rule 10b-5279 makes it unlawful to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice 
to defraud” or to “make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit a 
material fact necessary . . . to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading” in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security. 280 While typically deployed against 
misleading optimism, Rule10b-5 was written because a company president falsely 
talked down his company’s stock.281 Rule 12b-20 requires reports filed with the 
SEC to include “further material information. . . as may be necessary to make the 
                                                
275 17 C.F.R. § 240.15d-16 (2014). 
276 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1)(2014). No LexisNexis case annotation mentions an attempt to 
challenge this presumption.  
277 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(2) (2014). Regulation G, regulating non-GAAP disclosures, offers 
similar guidance. 17 C.F.R. § 244.101(b) (2014). 
278 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(c)(1) (2014). SEC rules, as applied, require only the signature of the firm, 
not the individual auditor. 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-02(a)(2).  
279 Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2014). 
280 Id. 
281 See Lewis D. Solomon & Dan Wilke, Securities Professionals and Rule 10b-5: Legal Standards, Industry 
Practices, Preventative Guidelines and Proposals for Reform, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 505, 509 n.12 (1975). 
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required statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, 
not misleading.”282 In these regulations, the operative phrase is “not misleading”. 
Fair presentation is not mentioned.    
C. U.K. Law 
The United Kingdom offers a working example of a financial market 
similar to that of the United States wherein a fair presentation equivalent—
known as “true and fair view” (TFV)—has been statutorily prioritized over 
GAAP compliance since 1947.283 In broad terms, the relevant differences 
between the United Kingdom and United States are few. The countries’ legal and 
accounting professions share common law heritage, legal procedure, and 
regulatory environment. Their capital markets, though of different scales,284 are 
roughly equivalent in terms of the concentration of ownership in publicly traded 
companies285 and market capitalization in relation to GDP.286 Both countries 
periodically experience large-scale financial reporting fraud,287 though the 
comparative local impact of fraud is not clear.  
                                                
282 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2014). The phrase “not misleading” currently appears ninety times in 
Title 17 of the C.F.R. However, the scope of required information disclosures may be limited by 
an SEC Confidential Treatment Order (CTO). 17 C.F.R. § 240.24b-2 (2014). A March 2, 2014 
search of the SEC’s EDGAR database returned 1,095 Confidential Treatment Orders filed since 
2008. CTOs have been criticized for depriving investors and creditors of highly material 
information. See, e.g., Nadelle Grossman, Out of the Shadows: Requiring Strategic Management Disclosure, 
116 W. VA. L. REV. 197 (2013) (advocating disclosure of strategic management processes to the 
same extent as risk management). 
283 See GEORGE BOMPAS QC, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS ¶ 12 ( 2013), 
available at http://www.lapfforum.org/TTx2/press/ifrs-opinion (reciting the 1947 statutory debut 
of “true and fair view” as a “paramount requirement” in the Companies Act 1947, Sections 13 
and 16). 
284 The 2012 U.K. and U.S. stock market capitalization was $3,019 and $18,668 billion, 
respectively. See THEGLOBALECONOMY.COM, http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/economies/ 
(last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
285 See Luca Enriques & Paolo Volpin, Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe, 21 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117, 118-19 (2007) (reporting the 1995 proportions of “widely held” firms 
among the largest twenty firms in the U.S. and U.K. as 80 and 100 percent, respectively).  
286 The 2012 U.K. and U.S. stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP was 123 and 115 
percent, respectively. See THEGLOBALECONOMY.COM, 
http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/economies (last visited Nov. 25, 2014). 
287 Leading U.S. fraud cases are discussed in Part I. In the United Kingdom, Walmart competitor 
Tesco is currently under investigation by the Serious Fraud Office [hereinafter SFO] for alleged 
revenue accounting fraud. See Peter Evans, Tesco Fraud Investigation Opened, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 
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Despite the similarities, one regulatory difference stands out: In the 
United Kingdom, a single, independent entity, the Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC), sets and enforces U.K. standards for corporate reporting (including 
accounting standards), auditing, and corporate governance.288 In the United 
States, these responsibilities are divided among three organizations: FASB, 
PCAOB, and SEC. One result of the U.K. “united command” structure is 
consistency—notably lacking in the United States—between accounting and 
auditing standards and between the two sets of standards and their enforcement.  
The United Kingdom, as a European Union (EU) member, is subject to 
EU law. The EU Accounting Directive (Directive) requires member states to 
ensure that financial statements “give a true and fair view” (TFV) of the firm’s 
financial position (shown in the balance sheet) and profit or loss (portrayed in the 
income statement), regardless of company size or accounting framework.289 In 
exceptional cases where application of the relevant accounting framework fails to 
deliver a TFV, the Directive requires that companies do so by departing from the 
framework.290  
The EU’s IAS Regulation obligates public U.K. companies to follow 
IFRS in their consolidated statements.291 Otherwise, companies are free to choose 
                                                                                                                           
2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-k-s-sfo-to-investigate-tesco-1414593597 
(outlining the SFO’s jurisdiction over the investigation and its accounting provenance). See also 
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, (2015) available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/ (describing the 
responsibilities of the SFO). 
288 About the FRC, FRC.ORG.UK, https://www.frc.org.uk/About-the-FRC.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 
2014); Memorandum from Stephen Haddrill, for the FRC, and David Lawton, for the FCA, (April 
2, 2013), available at https://frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Memorandum-of-
Understanding-between-the-Financial.pdf (describing responsibilities of FRC). 
289 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003 on the 
Annual Financial Statements, Consolidated Financial Statements, and Related Reports of Certain 
Types of Undertakings and amending Directive 2006/43/EC  O.J. (L 182) 29, art. 4 [hereinafter 
Directive]. See also MARTIN MOORE QC, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND THE 
TRUE AND FAIR VIEW. ¶¶ 41-61 ( 2013) [hereinafter Moore 2013], available at 
https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/FRC-Board/Martin-Moore-QC-Opinion-3-October-2013.pdf 
(explicating the relationship between prudence and true and fair view and arguing that the latter 
can exist without the first).  
290 Directive at 20 ¶ 9. See also Moore 2013 (arguing that this so-called “true and fair” override 
survived the replacement of “true and fair view” with “fair presentation” in the updated IAS 1).  
291 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 403(1) (Eng.).  
280 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16 
 
 
between IFRS or Companies Act 2006 accounting frameworks.292 As discussed in 
Part II, IAS 1 paragraph 19 requires IFRS-compliant firms to depart from IFRS 
in order to correct misleading financial statements.  
No matter the accounting framework, TFV continues to be the U.K. 
financial reporting lodestar. Unlike the SEC, the FRC has consistently and 
unambiguously defended the TFV override as essential to quality financial 
reporting.293 Nevertheless, in the wake of the IASB’s recent replacement of TFV 
with fair presentation, the applicability of TFV to IFRS financial statements has 
been energetically debated, most visibly through dueling Queens Counsel (QC) 
opinions commissioned by the Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF)294 
and the FRC. 295  
TFV is not defined in EU or U.K. legislation but has been equated by 
leading British commentators to fair presentation296 and usefulness which, in turn, 
compromises relevance, reliability, comparability, and understandability.297 A 
                                                
292 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 395 (Eng.) (creating the accounting option for individual 
accounts); Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 403(2) (creating the accounting option for group 
accounts). 
293 See, e.g., FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL [hereinafter FRC], TRUE AND FAIR (2014), available 
at https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Accounting-and-Reporting-Policy/True-and-
Fair-June-2014.pdf; FRC, TRUE AND FAIR (2011), https://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-
Documents/FRC/Paper-True-and-Fair.pdf; FRC, Importance of true and fair view in both UK GAAP 
and IFRS reaffirmed by the Accounting Standards Board and Auditing Practices Board (Jul. 21, 2011), 
https://frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2011/July/Importance-of-true-and-fair-
view-in-both-UK-GAAP-a.aspx;  FRC, Relevance of ‘True and Fair” concept confirmed (May 19, 2008), 
https://frc.org.uk/News-and-Events/FRC-Press/Press/2008/May/Relevance-of-True-and-Fair-
concept-confirmed.aspx.  
294 Bompas, supra note 277 (questioning whether companies can both follow IFRS and override it 
using TFV). 
295 Moore 2013, at ¶¶ 70-82, at 21-26 (rebutting Bompas, supra note 277, and reaffirming the 
continuing preeminence of TFV for all U.K. companies). See also FRC, TRUE AND FAIR, supra note 
287 (confirming the centrality of true and fair to accounting and auditing).  
296 See, e.g., Moore 2013, at ¶ 71 (reaffirming his 2008 assertion that “true and fair view” and “fair 
presentation” are equivalent); MARTIN MOORE QC, THE TRUE AND FAIRE REQUIREMENT 
REVISITED  ¶¶ 28-29 (2008), available at https://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-Documents/FRC/True-
and-Fair-Opinion,-Moore,-21-April-2008.pdf (quoting the IASB Framework for the proposition 
that “true and fair” and “present fairly” are synonymous) [hereinafter Moore 2008]; Bompas, supra 
note 277, at 22 n.37 (quoting with approval U.K. Minister of Industry and the Regions, Margaret 
Hodge MP, to the effect that TFV and fair presentation are equivalent). 
297 See Moore 2013, at ¶¶ 72-73. 
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highly regarded 1983 QC opinion reasoned that TFV requires information in 
“sufficient quantity and quality to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the 
readers to whom [it is] addressed” and that because reader expectations are in 
part a function of customary accounting practice, so is TFV.298  
Further emphasizing TFV’s importance, the Companies Act 2006 requires 
auditors to opine separately on whether the financial statements (a) “give a true 
and fair view” of profit and loss (income statement) and “state of affairs” 
(balance sheet) and (b) conform to the relevant accounting framework.299 The “a” 
in “a true fair view” signifies that TFV is dynamic and flexible, not unique or 
absolute,300 in relation to circumstances and reasonable reader expectations.301  
Scarce EU and U.K. case law on point generally holds that delivery of a 
TFV is of overriding importance, adherence to generally accepted accounting 
practices is prima facie evidence of TFV, and GAAP-compliant statements may 
fail to deliver a TFV. In contrast to the U.S. question-of-fact approach, whether 
financial statements give a TFV is a question of law with respect to which courts 
should treat accounting practice as persuasive authority.302  
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Since 1942, when the SEC declared that financial statements exist to 
perform “the function of enlightenment,” not to comply with GAAP,303 the SEC, 
                                                
298 LEONARD HOFFMANN QC & MARY H. ARDEN, LEGAL OPINION OBTAINED BY ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS COMMITTEE OF TRUE AND FAIR VIEW, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE 
ROLE OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS ¶ 8 (1983), available at https://www.frc.org.uk/FRC-
Documents/FRC/True-and-FairOpinionHoffmann-and-Arden-13-Sept.pdf. 
299 Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 495(3) (Eng.). 
300 Supplemental Joint Opinion of Leonard Hoffman QC and MH Arden ¶ 5 (1984). 
301 Id. at ¶ 9. 
302 See, e.g., Case C-234/94, Tomberger v. Gebrüder Von Der Wettern, 1996 E.C.R. I-3133 (prioritizing 
TFV over the German government’s formalistic view of revenue recognition); Case C-275/97, 
DE + ES Bauunternehmung GmbH v Finanzamt Bergheim, 1999 E.C.R. I-5331 ¶ 40 (affirming the 
supremacy of TFV over detailed standards); Balloon Promotions Ltd. v. Wilson (Inspector of Taxes), 
[2006] S.T.C. (SCD U.K.) 167 ¶ 152 (holding that goodwill “should be construed in accordance 
with legal not accountancy principles” because U.K. GAAP’s SSAP 22 is “deficient”); MARY 
ARDEN, OPINION: THE TRUE AND FAIR REQUIREMENT ¶ 2 (1993) (stating “whether accounts 
satisfy [TFV] is a question of law for the court” about which courts must consider evidence of 
accounting practice). 
303 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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FASB, and PCAOB have aggressively pushed to eliminate fair presentation and 
professional judgment from financial reporting. As a proximate result, accounting 
experts have dissociated FASB GAAP from integrity and fairness, while federal 
judges have quarantined “accounting materiality” and FASB GAAP as irrelevant 
in leading federal securities cases.  
Meanwhile, contemporary accounting research questions FASB GAAP’s 
accuracy, relevance to investors, and usefulness in predicting future cash flows. 
Leaders of the accounting profession, domestic and international, have decried 
the U.S. obsession with GAAP compliance. In counterpoise, professionals, 
regulators, and courts in the United Kingdom have enshrined TFV as the 
overarching financial statement requirement before which even GAAP must bow. 
The SEC’s FR-70, FASB GAAP Hierarchy paragraph A10, PCAOB AU 
411.04, and standard audit report all mislead by glossing over FASB GAAP’s 
practical weaknesses and lack of real general acceptance. By naked diktat, FR-70 
declares FASB GAAP “generally accepted.” Paragraph A10 claims that selection 
of FASB GAAP principles “results in relevant and reliable financial information” 
but fails to anchor relevance to any objective or to acknowledge research 
impeaching FASB GAAP’s reliability. PCAOB AU 411.04 requires auditors to 
opine on whether the financial statements “are informative of matters that may 
affect their use, understanding, and interpretation,” while concealing their 
purposelessness and the systemic deficiencies of their FASB GAAP backbone.  
Today’s standard U.S. audit opinions are significantly less informative 
than those of 1933. Then, auditors certified their belief that the financial 
statements were true and not misleading. Until 1962, Andersen auditors opined 
separately on fair presentation and compliance, just as their modern U.K. 
counterparts separately address TFV. In unflattering contrast, today’s U.S. 
auditors coyly concatenate “fairly presented” and “in conformity with GAAP,” 
falsely leading readers to infer that these phrases offer separate, meaningful 
assurances. At the same time, their audit reports—endorsed by AICPA or 
PCAOB—fail to tell readers what they mean by material. Perhaps this is because 
the auditors themselves do not know what it means. 
After sixty years of haphazard development, the alphabet soup of 
essential U.S. securities law terms—including GAAP, materiality, reliability, not 
misleading, and fair presentation—lacks generally accepted definitions and internal 
coherence. This fog of regulation harms markets and the law by simultaneously 
offering cover to accountants seeking to avoid professional responsibility and to 
plaintiffs, prosecutors, and courts too eager to stretch the law to their advantage. 
For example, the Fifth Circuit’s subjectivist twist on materiality—tying materiality 
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to metaphysical musings of the “ordinary man”—introduces arbitrary legal risk 
into the calculus of corporate governance thereby endangering free markets and 
the rule of law.  
The PCAOB’s acceptance of accounting principles from multiple 
jurisdictions304 casts FASB GAAP as but one accounting framework among 
many. So does SEC Regulation G, which defines GAAP for FPIs as whatever 
non-U.S.-GAAP principles the FPI uses in its financial statements.305 AICPA 
Rule 203.05, which authorizes literally any comprehensive basis of accounting, 
similarly demonstrates the falsity of the PCAOB’s claim that non-FASB-GAAP 
standards for judging fair presentation are lacking. They are not lacking. Rather, 
they are simply not used.  
The Second Circuit’s Ebbers mythology—that FASB GAAP requires that 
financial statements be not misleading, recognizes that technical compliance with 
particular GAAP rules may produce misleading financial statements, and requires 
that financial statements as a whole accurately reflect the financial status of the 
company306—is evidence that FASB GAAP misleads even highly educated 
readers by promising what it is not designed to deliver.  
That bench and bar avoid FASB GAAP is hardly surprising. In federal 
securities cases, Simon long ago replaced GAAP with three words: not materially 
misleading. Simon and its progeny are the proximate result of the accounting 
profession’s single-minded adherence to GAAP and rejection of principled fair 
presentation. Remember, “GAAP doesn't talk about misleading. GAAP doesn't 
talk about integrity. GAAP talks about accounting rules.”307 No expert could 
credibly say this about accounting practice in the United Kingdom, where the 
U.K. Companies Act has successfully prioritized TFV over GAAP for several 
decades. With U.S. accountants mechanistically following bright-line GAAP and 
the legal issue in securities cases reduced to whether financial statements are 
“misleading,” accounting experts may understandably be seen as so much 
irrelevant sand in the legal machine.   
                                                
304 PCAOB AU § 411.01 (2013). Reconciliation of foreign-GAAP net income and shareholders’ 
equity to equivalent FASB GAAP figures is required for non-IFRS statements. 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-
01(a)(2) (2014). Thus, what prevents U.S. public companies from using IFRS or some other 
GAAP is not a PCAOB rule, but FR-70.  
305 See supra note 271 and accompanying text.. 
306 U.S. v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110, 126 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1274 (2007).  
307 See Skilling Transcript at 16724-823. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conveniently, TFV under the U.K. Companies Act roughly equates to fair 
presentation. At the same time, SOX Sections 302 and 906 already require 
company executives to separately certify the fair presentation of their financial 
statements. All that remains to convert U.S. public companies to a bona fide fair 
presentation model is to clearly define fair presentation and expressly require 
accountants to follow the model.  
As John C. Burton noted, fair presentation is meaningful only in relation 
to financial statement objectives.308 Thus, financial statements could be defined, 
by statute or regulation, as fairly presented and therefore not misleading when 
they satisfy Concepts No. 8’s three usefulness criteria—helpfulness in predicting 
cash flows, relevance, and representational faithfulness—through the eyes of 
reasonable equity investors and creditors as defined by AICPA AU-C § 320. 
Materiality would serve as a pervasive constraint. Satisfaction of May’s inferential 
imperative would signal representational faithfulness and would fully satisfy the 
securities law “not misleading” mandate as interpreted by Simon and its progeny. 
The model could include a rebuttable presumption that compliance with any 
accounting framework achieves fair presentation. Consistent with the IAS 1 and 
U.K. Companies Act paradigms, financial statements would be required to depart 
from the applicable accounting framework whenever necessary to achieve fair 
presentation. Thus, financial statements and audit reports would say what they 
mean and mean what they say, offering users the best available information in the 
core financial statements and thereby rendering remedial disclosure unnecessary. 
   
Beyond mandating fair presentation, Congress should statutorily decide 
what auditors and company officers must tell financial statement readers about it 
and its relationship to GAAP compliance. Even in the United Kingdom, where 
courts have made law for nearly a millennium, Parliament statutorily controls this 
question. Currently, SEC regulations do not require auditors to opine on fair 
presentation, GAAP compliance, or not misleading status. SOX requires officers 
to certify all three while, in contrast, the PCAOB and AICPA allow auditors to 
ignore “not misleading.” Statutory definition of fair presentation as outlined 
above would resolve these inconsistencies and redundancies. It should be paired 
with the requirement that audit opinions separately address fair presentation and 
compliance in a manner consistent with the U.K. Companies Act.  
                                                
308 See Burton, supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
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Absent these recommended reforms, the best protection for accountants 
is May- and Burton-style fair presentation. Case law warns that the putative 
GAAP safe harbor is illusory. Taking FASB GAAP and other SEC model 
elements as they now are, audit opinions that satisfy Simon and current PCAOB 
requirements309 should include language like the following:  
In our opinion, the accompanying financial statements meet the 
usefulness criteria of FASB Concepts No. 8 and the fair presentation 
requirements of PCAOB AU 411.04 in all material respects, where “material” is 
defined by AICPA AU-C § 320 which assumes that readers have reasonable 
knowledge of business and accounting, diligently study the financial statements 
and appreciate their inherent uncertainty. They were prepared in accordance with 
the FASB Codification, except as explained in Note X, and provide probabilistic 
estimates, within practical limits, of the Company’s historical financial position, 
earnings, and cash flows based partly on historical transaction amounts and partly 
on fair values as of the balance sheet date.   
Advocates of the status quo may argue that these proposals would lead to 
chaos for analysts, investors and accountants confronted with a multiplicity of 
accounting frameworks and audit opinions. But the status quo is chaos. In court, 
costly FASB GAAP expert testimony is dismissed as irrelevant while defendants 
suddenly confront unforeseen legal exposure. Similarly, latent chaos lurks in the 
market where misleading FASB GAAP financial statements misinform investors 
and periodically precipitate debilitating financial shocks like Enron, Worldcom, and 
Lehman.  
Public companies and their auditors should be unambiguously obligated 
to depart from FASB GAAP when necessary to avoid misleading readers. Non-
public and non-U.S. companies already are, with the blessing of SEC, PCAOB 
and AICPA. As a side benefit, practical access to a fair presentation override for 
U.S. public companies can be expected to openly highlight misleading FASB 
GAAP and thereby hasten positive change.  
FASB apologists may counter that fair presentation can always be finagled 
within FASB GAAP. Yet, the extensive record—including the FASB’s response 
to Lehman—suggests that FASB, SEC, PCAOB and U.S. accounting profession 
know otherwise. Meanwhile, the unitary U.K. regulator points clearly and 
consistently to true and fair view and fair presentation.   
                                                
309 See PCAOB AU § 411.04. 
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For the good of markets and securities litigants, accountants should be 
taken seriously in court but only if they exercise independent professional 
judgment in preparing and auditing financial statements. Eight decades of bright-
line SEC regulation have proven what George May, the AIA, and J.M.B. Hoxsey 
knew in 1933. “There is no dispensing with judgment in the preparation of 
accounts,” “uniform financial statements simply will not solve the problem,” and 
investors are “deceived, rather than protected, by such requirements.”310 Beyond 
deceiving investors, uniformity shrinks the arena for exercise of professional 
judgment about which courts might solicit expert testimony. Benchmarking 
financial statement fair presentation against Concepts No. 8 would better inform 
financial statement users, require accountants to take professional responsibility 
for their decisions, and make expert accounting testimony more relevant and 
compelling in U.S. courtrooms. 
 
                                                
310 Memorandum from George O. May to the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency 
4-5 (Mar. 10, 1934) (on file with author). 
